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PAYING IT FORWARD:  THE CASE FOR A SPECIFIC STATUTORY LIMITATION ON EXCLUSIVE 
RIGHTS FOR USER-GENERATED CONTENT UNDER COPYRIGHT LAW 
WARREN B. CHIK 
ABSTRACT 
This article examines user-generated content (“UGC”) and the significance of re-inventions in the 
context of an increasingly user-centric internet environment and an information sharing society.  It 
will explain the need to provide a statutory limitation in the form of an exception or exemption for 
socially beneficial UGC on the exclusive rights under copyright law.  This will also have the effect of 
protecting the internet intermediary that hosts and shares UGC.  Nascent but abortive attempts 
have been made by Canada to introduce just such a provision into her copyright legislation, while 
some principles and rules have also emerged from various interest groups and stakeholders in the 
attempt of providing a balanced approach towards UGC under the larger scheme of copyright 
objectives.  Customary internet usages and norms relating to UGC will also be examined.  These will 
be evaluated with a view to extracting useful guidelines to construct the parameters of a fair 
statutory limitation proposed for the legal reform of copyright law. 
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PAYING IT FORWARD:  THE CASE FOR A SPECIFIC STATUTORY LIMITATION 
ON EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS FOR USER-GENERATED CONTENT UNDER 
COPYRIGHT LAW 
WARREN B. CHIK* 
INTRODUCTION 
 “You.  Yes, you.  You control the Information Age.  Welcome to your world.” 
TIME Person of the Year, 20061 
 
The evolution of Web 2.0 and other new digital technologies have enabled digital 
content to be easily reproduced and communicated online, without the permission of 
the copyright owner.  The most prominent feature of Web 2.0 is the rise of user-
generated content (“UGC”)2 and UGC-related technological services, applications, 
and web-based platforms.  Such a revolutionary model of human interaction 
inevitably raises legal ambiguity and tensions under copyright law.  Copyright law 
and its complicated balance of public and private interests is once again the object of 
scrutiny and the appropriate subject of review.  This paper proposes a statutory 
reformulation of the boundaries of copyright protection and liability in order to 
maintain the equilibrium of rights and interests over creative works in the context of 
the Internet Age and in the face of the empowered user. 
I. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 
A major phenomenon of the Internet Age is the empowerment of the user and 
the rise of the user-creator, which is facilitated by the development of information 
and communications technology geared towards UGC.  These internet-based 
applications and World Wide Web (“WWW”) platforms supply the tools and the forum 
for the devolvement of creativity to the masses for mass consumption.3  Much of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
* © Warren B. Chik 2011.  Warren B. Chik, Asst. Prof. of Law, Singapore Management 
University, Singapore. LLB (NUS, Singapore 1996), LLM (Tulane, LA 2001), LLM (UCL, London 
2004). Advocate & Solicitor (Singapore), Attorney and Counselor-at-law (New York), Solicitor 
(England & Wales). 
1 Person of the Year, TIME, Dec. 25, 2006, at cover page.  Time Magazine was referring to 
internet users and the contributors of UGC and indirectly, the WWW and UGC platforms that 
nurture and support such content).  It was thus no coincidence that the Time Magazine Person of 
the Year for 2010 was the founder of Facebook, just such a UGC platform.  See Lev Grossman, 
Person of the Year 2010:  Mark Zuckerberg, TIME, Dec. 27, 2010, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2036683_2037183,00.html. 
2 See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OP & DEV., WORKING PARTY IN THE INFORMATION ECONOMY 4 
(Apr. 12, 2007) [hereinafter OECD REPORT], available at http:// 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/14/38393115.pdf. 
3 Id. 
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UGC can be original such as those materials generated through citizen reporting,4 
but much UGC involves varying degrees of borrowed materials, which are the subject 
matter of concern and the main focus of this paper. 
It is important to establish a clear policy and legal outcome on the status of UGC 
and the legitimacy of the players in the creation and dissemination chain for UGC.  
The rise of powerful internet giants like Facebook for social networking,5 YouTube 
for video-sharing,6 Wikipedia for collaborative learning,7 and online blogs and news 
sites for citizen-journalism are the engines that power the creation of UGC.  On one 
hand, the proliferation of UGC is in turn redefining human relationships and the 
way society interacts.  On the other hand, there are various impediments to UGC, 
which restrict interaction.  These impediments are a result of restrictive and 
monopolistic copyright laws, digital rights management (“DRM”), technological 
protection measures (“TPM”), anti-circumvention laws (“ACL”), and restrictive 
licensing requirements. 
The objective of this paper is to assess the legal standing of the user-creator and 
UGC under copyright law, with specific focus on downstream creators and innovators 
and follow-on creations that re-use and re-define the existing and original works of 
others.  The paper also examines and explains the significance of UGC that will 
justify legal accommodation under the copyright regime and the reason for choosing 
statutory limitation as the ideal solution. 
Part II explains UGC and the backdrop of Web 2.0 technology.  The role and 
functions of the user-creator and the assortment of UGC, categorized by social 
function and type of content are also analyzed in this section.  Part III examines how 
the fair use doctrine, in the United States (“U.S.”) has been applied in order to 
protect the downstream user-creator from copyright liability.  This examination 
highlights the inadequacies of fair use as the sole instrument of protection for UGC.  
The discussion also addresses the practical problems that can arise in attempting to 
protect the creation and distribution of UGC in the face of the current copyright 
protection regime and an increasingly hostile and non-conducive online environment. 
Part IV of the paper visits and reviews copyright objectives in the context of the 
digital age with both a utilitarian outlook and a view to justify reform for statutory 
UGC.  Then a proposed reform will be offered by way of a UGC carve out in order to 
fulfill the social objectives of UGC and serve U.S. policy interests.  The options for 
UGC limitation will also be canvassed and their features will be assessed.  In the 
process, policy reasons for the type of UGC and the technological platforms identified 
for legislative protection are provided. 
Inter-disciplinary scholastic studies, the Canadian draft UGC limitation 
provision, and the various stakeholder principles and guidelines are examined to 
help identify internet customs relating to UGC and serve also as precedents and 
authorities for identifying a fair balance of rights between UGC and copyright 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 Id. at 15. 
5 About Facebook, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/facebook?sk=info (last visited Jan. 30, 
2012). 
6 About Youtube, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/about_youtube (last visited Jan. 30, 
2012). 
7 WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page (last visited Jan. 30, 2012). 
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ownership.  The balance of interests will be made by determining the scope of 
protection of the proposed UGC statutory limitation provision itself and two options 
will be given.  Finally, this paper explores the potential legal and technical hurdles to 
such proposed approaches and the incidental effects of the proposal on the UGC 
supply chain. 
To summarize, the aim of this paper is to justify and encourage the creation and 
delivery of UGC by protecting the user-creator and UGC platforms from potential 
copyright persecution.  The aim is also to provide an environment conducive for UGC 
in a balanced and fair manner that will be ultimately beneficial to society as a whole, 
without carving out too much of the copyright owner’s exclusive rights.  In fact, in the 
wider scheme of things and in a more holistic outlook, copyright owners as a part of 
society can also benefit by a “paying it forward” UGC provision in many ways that 
will be explained throughout the paper. 
For the purposes of this paper, references to existing works include copyrighted 
works and other subject matter.  References to UGC generally includes all categories 
of UGC as commonly understood by the layman unless in the context of a legal 
categorization.  References to a statutory limitation (and other synonyms such as 
carve out, exclusion, and protection) covers any form of statutory protection from 
infringement liability unless otherwise specified. 
II.  USER-GENERATED CONTENT 
A. Web 2.0 and the Rise of User-Generated Content 
1. Centrality of User Empowerment in the Web 2.0 Environment 
There is no consensus on the definition of “Web 2.0” or even that it is anything 
more than a buzzword.  However, it does represent a clear evolution of digital 
technology from the inception of the WWW, and how the internet is utilized by its 
stakeholders, to what it is today.  Generally, Web 2.0 is used to describe a set of 
characteristics that fall under a common theme, which is the development of 
information technology (“IT”) to make the WWW more user-friendly.  This in turn 
can encourage more active user interaction, involvement and participation in 
generating content and in creating a less generic interface.8  These characteristics 
are multifaceted and involve:  (1) the development of internet-based applications that 
are more user-centric in design; (2) increasing engagement in user collaboration; and 
the encouragement of both original and derivative UGC.9  Even the non-
                                                                                                                                                 
8 See generally, Tim O’Reilly, What is Web 2.0:  Design Patterns and Business Models for the 
Next Generation of Software, 65 COMM. & STRATEGIES, 1, 22 (2007) (coining the term “Web 2.0” and 
describing it as the “architecture of participation” that produces “rich user experiences”). 
9 See SAMUEL E. TROSOW ET AL., MOBILIZING USER-GENERATED CONTENT FOR CANADA’S 
DIGITAL ADVANTAGE 5 (Univ. of Ontario, 2010), available at http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fimspub/21/ 
(providing an overview and examples of the complicated overlap between “three major domains” of 
UGC, small-scale tools and collaborative UGC).  
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technologically sophisticated internet user can now actively participate and 
contribute to the information shared on the WWW and interact online with relative 
ease.10 
The main feature of Web 2.0 is this focus on the decentralization of power, 
individual engagement, developing a ‘digital society,’ and ‘grassroots culture building’ 
in the internet environment. 11  Web 2.0 describes a change in the nature and a shift 
in the social dynamics of the WWW rather than any technical changes in the internet 
infrastructure itself.  Web 2.0, thus, encompasses the practices of social networking, 
blogging, video sharing, music mash-ups, and other user-centric activities involving 
the user as a creator.12  The application platforms supporting such activities require 
a greater role to be played by internet intermediaries, through the development of 
facilitative forms of web-based services technology and functions.13  These 
intermediaries inevitably influence user behavior and thereby shape the development 
of the WWW, even as they react to user demands.14 
2. User-Centric Trends in Many Jurisdictions 
Concomitant with the development of Web 2.0 technology is the increasing 
awareness of the need for stronger user rights under the copyright regime.15  One 
way that the courts have recognized this trend is through more expansive 
interpretation and application of the fair use exception in the U.S. copyright law.16  
Statutory limitations exist in the copyright laws of other legal systems and countries 
too.  The national legislatures in many countries have reacted in a similar fashion to 
that of the U.S. by increasing the scope of the statutory limitations.17  This has been 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 See, e.g., OECD REPORT, supra note 2, at 57–58 (indicating that one of the key factors in in 
the growth of UGC was the ease of use in creating and publishing). 
11 Id. at 6, 9. 
12 Id. at 15. 
13 See, e.g., id. at 12 (indicating that there are more than 200 million pieces of content on the 
internet that are under various licenses, indicating the involvement of intermediaries).  
14 See, e.g., Ian Paul, Grading Facebook’s Privacy Changes, PC WORLD (May 27, 2010), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/197339/grading_facebooks_privacy_changes.html (discussing 
changes Facebook has made to its privacy platform and public responses to the changes). 
15 See OECD REPORT, supra note 2, at 7. 
16 See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1156 (N.D. Cal. 2008)  (quoting S. 
REP. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998)) (“Requiring owners to consider fair use will help ‘ensure[] that the 
efficiency of the Internet will continue to improve and that the variety and quality of services on the 
Internet will expand’  without compromising ‘the movies, music, software and literary works that 
are the fruit of American creative genius.’”) (alteration in original).   
17 See, e.g., CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, para. 48–60 
(Can.) (illustrating limitation on Canadian copyright law as it applies to what is considered “fair 
dealing”).  To those unfamiliar with “fair dealing”, it is a narrower limitation to the exclusive rights 
in copyright law than “fair use” that is more commonly adopted in many common law countries that 
is purpose-specific (e.g. the use has to be in relation to study or research only) as well as requiring a 
fairness assessment. 
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accomplished through liberal judicial interpretations and legislative amendments 
that incorporate purpose-specific statutory exemptions into the existing provisions.18 
In Canada, for instance, the Canadian Supreme Court judges in the seminal 
case of CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Canada19 enhanced the users’ 
copyright protection in their oft quoted statement that “[t]he fair dealing exception, 
like other exceptions in the [Canadian] Copyright Act, is a user’s right.”20  The case 
involved an internet intermediary and its service that benefitted its patrons.21  The 
Court also effectively extended the protection of the Canadian fair dealing exclusion 
to the intermediary servicing the user so the user could achieve the benefits of the 
service.22  
The trend in the U.S. and many other jurisdictions indicates a stronger 
protection for user interests in the digital age and recognizes the benefits that new 
forms of technology accords to users.23  In the U.S., the flexible fair use exception has 
been used by the courts to cover many new types of uses and purposes.24  The list of 
fair use factors has been supplemented by newer and more applicable tests over the 
years, many of which were formulated to deal with technology-related services and 
functions.25  The exception has also been utilized for the protection against indirect 
as well as direct infringement claims.26  Moreover, the U.S. has exported the essence 
of its fair use provision to other jurisdictions, such as Singapore, Israel, and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 See, e.g., Singapore Copyright Act (Act No. 2/1987) Cap. 63, Part IV, div. 6, s. 35, 109  
(regulating fair dealing for the purposes of research and study); Jeremy de Beer & Christopher D. 
Clemmer, Global Trends in Online Copyright Enforcement:  A Non-Neutral Role For Network 
Intermediaries?, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 375, 388 (2009) (examining a worldwide shift in laws, policies, 
and practices pertaining to intermediaries' role in online copyright enforcement, with emphasis on 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, the European Union, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, 
Singapore, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States). 
19 CCH Canadian, 1 S.C.R. 339.  
20 Id. at para. 48 (“In order to maintain the proper balance between the rights of a copyright 
owner and users’ interests, it must not be interpreted restrictively.”).  
21 Id. at para. 1.  
22 Id. at para. 6.  Amongst other issues, the Court interpreted fair dealing to the facts in that 
case more broadly than ever before when applying it to the photocopying of legal materials.  Id. at 
paras. 48–60; see also Parveen Esmail, CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada:  Case 
Comment on a Landmark Copyright Case, 10 APPEAL 13, 19 (2005) (noting that the Law Society of 
Upper Canada decision expanded the scope of the fair dealing exception dramatically). 
23 See, e.g., Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1003 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(requiring a copyright owner to make a fair use consideration before issuing a take down notice); see 
also 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006) (adding provision to protect internet users from abusive copyright 
owners). 
24 See, e.g., Notice of Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 43825 (July 27, 2010) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 201) 
(classifying some uses of digital media as non-infringing).  In July 2010, the Librarian of Congress 
made the determination that certain uses of copyrighted DVDs were no longer considered a violation 
of copyright.  Id. 
25 Id. 
26 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 489 (1984) 
(indicating that causation can be shown both directly and indirectly, and explaining the analysis for 
each approach). 
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Philippines, where the trend in technology-related cases also appears to favor users 
and technology creators.27 
The increased creation and use of purpose-specific statutory exemptions is also a 
global trend.28  The legislature of many countries has made statutory amendments to 
accommodate internet and WWW functions and to update their copyright statutes to 
include widely recognized user practices.29  Some examples of recent exemptions that 
have been popular include the backing up of computer programs, caching, personal 
use, educational use, and parody or satire.30 
Finally, even the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) safe harbor 
provisions that protect various fundamental internet technological functions have the 
effect of protecting the intermediary that is an integral part of the chain for the 
storage and distribution of UGC in the U.S.31 
B. UGC Defined and Categorized 
1. Generally Defined 
UGC has rapidly proliferated and flourished in recent years due to the 
phenomenal growth in the public’s demand for electronic channels of communication.  
A growing appetite for the diversity of views and the ease of interaction offered by 
the internet, mobile devices, and modern digital media have also driven the 
expansion of UGC.32  Many new forms of UGC-based businesses and new 
UGC-related economic models adopted by traditional businesses have developed 
online platforms and software applications to facilitate the creation and distribution 
of content by end-users.33  The monetization of UGC, and lucrative businesses that 
                                                                                                                                                 
27 See, e.g., RecordTV Pte Ltd. v. MediaCorp TV Singapore Pte Ltd., [2011] 1 S.L.R. 830 (Sing.) 
(holding that there was no copyright liability or infringement on the part of the internet 
intermediary, an online digital video recorder). 
28 See, e.g., GOWERS REVIEW, infra note 218, at 119 (recommending an incremental approach 
for the U.K.).  Countries, including the U.K., Australia and Canada, for example, that do not have or 
have rejected the U.S. fair use system, often prefer an incremental approach through the expansion 
of purpose-specific exemptions.    
29 See, e.g., Notice of Final Rule, supra note 24, at 43825 (providing an example of a statutory 
amendment in the U.S.). 
30 Id. at 43826. 
31 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006) (establishing limitations on liability relating to material online). 
32 See OECD REPORT, supra note 2, at 9–12.  Initial empirical studies and surveys have shown, 
in various contexts, the phenomenal growth rate of UGC and its socio-cultural popularity.  Id.  
However, measuring UGC is difficult given the various variables and the fluid, intangible and 
transient nature of online transactions.  Id. at 9.  
33 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, A SINGLE MARKET FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
BOOSTING CREATIVITY AND INNOVATION TO PROVIDE ECONOMIC GROWTH, HIGH QUALITY JOBS AND 
FIRST CLASS PRODUCTS AND SERVICES IN EUROPE 12 (May 24, 2011), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/docs/ipr_strategy/COM_2011_287_en.pdf.  Traditional 
businesses are driven to diversify and transition to the electronic platform due to market and social 
forces, such as traditional media companies that have a presence online.  Id. 
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emerge from it, are main contributors to the Web 2.0 bubble.34  This in turn feeds and 
encourages UGC and the cycle of growth is perpetuated for both user created content 
and technology alike.  The popularity of UGC can also be attributed to the 
convergence of a set of technological, social, economic, legal and institutional 
drivers.35  The UGC value and publishing chain is also simplified and more accessible 
to users than traditional mediums.36  Moreover, the buzz is already developing on 
Web 3.0, involving web-based “clouds” taking over traditional desktop-based 
applications, which will continue this trend of shifting control from organizations to 
individuals.37 
There is no single widely accepted definition of UGC.38  In the 2006 Organisation 
of Economic and Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) Report on the subject, 
user-created content (“UCC”), the equivalent of UGC, was defined as:  “(i) content 
made publicly available over the [i]nternet, (ii) which reflects a “certain amount of 
creative effort”, and (iii) which is “created outside of professional routines and 
practices.”39  The public, creative, and non-commercial natures of UGC are relevant in 
defining the boundaries of rights, duties, and liabilities that can reasonably be placed 
on UGC creators and platforms.  From this general definition, classification of the 
categories of UCC or UGC—based on the type of content, host, distribution and 
purpose—can be drawn up.  These classifications encompass a wide range of content, 
technology and services.40 
The focus of this paper is to define the sub-category of UGC that gives rise to 
copyright disputes and that should be accorded legal protection.  Hence, a narrower 
definition based on specific features of this sub-category of UGC will be identified and 
explained at a later stage. 
                                                                                                                                                 
34 See Top Sites, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/topsites (last visited Jan. 30, 2012).  According 
to Alexa, a website offering internet traffic data, UGC platforms currently occupy fifty percent of the 
top 500 sites on the WWW.  Id.  Facebook is ranked second, YouTube is ranked third, Blogger.com is 
fifth, Wikipedia is seventh and Twitter is ninth.  Id.  The others are major search engines and 
service providers.  Id.  See also OECD REPORT, supra note 2, at 23 (indicating that monetization of 
new business models and investments made on UGC platforms amounts to billions of dollars). 
35 See OECD REPORT, supra note 2, at 13–14. 
36 Id. at 15–20 (resulting from lower entry barriers, increasingly simplified technology and 
sophisticated users, less-to-no cost support and distribution, diversity of works and increasingly 
limitless digital storage space and life). 
37 See NICHOLAS CARR, THE BIG SWITCH:  REWIRING THE WORLD, FROM EDISON TO GOOGLE 21–
23 (W.W. Norton, 2008). 
38 See OECD REPORT, supra note 2, at 4. 
39 Id.; see also Daniel J. Gervais, User-Generated Content and Music File-Sharing:  A Look at 
Some of the More Interesting Aspects of Bill C-32, in MICHAEL GEIST, FROM “RADICAL EXTREMISM” 
TO “BALANCED COPYRIGHT”:  CANADIAN COPYRIGHT AND THE DIGITAL AGENDA 465 (Irwin Law, 2010) 
(making reference to the electronic medium in a definition of UGC as “content that is created using 
tools specific to the online environment and/or disseminated using such tools.”). 
40 OECD REPORT, supra note 2, at 15–16. 
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2. Categorizations and Comparisons 
UGC comes in many forms and can give rise to various types of comparison.41  
UGC can be text-based (e.g., blogs, articles, encyclopedias, and books) or image-based 
UGC (e.g., pictures, photos, drawings, and illustrations) and there can be audio and 
video UGC, too.42  UGC can also be categorized according to the type of platform or 
according to the wider social objectives and functions.43 
Under current fair use and fair dealing regimes, the purpose and character of 
the UGC, rather than the type of platform or the general social purpose, is the 
primary factor relevant in determining the protectability of the underlying content.44 
C. Copyright Issues Relating to User-Generated Content 
1. Re-Use in UGC as the Subject Matter of Dispute 
The current disputes between copyright owners and UGC creators revolves 
around derivative or copied works without authorization.45  The mere copying of 
content without more is generally not protectable under the fair use provision, unless 
the copy falls under a specific statutory exemption.46  Thus, there should be little 
confusion over the permissibility of such practices.47  It is the derivative use of 
existing works that is the main subject matter of copyright liability disputes.48 
Original digital content, which falls within the umbra of creative content, is 
generated by users that are facilitated by web-based application services and 
platforms.49  The practice of re-inventing or re-creating digitized works, using one or 
more existing copyrighted work, forms a penumbra of digital user creations.50  The 
re-creation of third party content can involve a portion or full versions of existing 
works in any combination.51  “Vidding”52 and “mash-ups”53 are just some terms that 
                                                                                                                                                 
41 See, e.g., id. (charting out comparisons of the various types of UCC). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 44–46. 
45 See, e.g., Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2008) 
(discussing how a mother posted a video of her children online with a sample of a Prince song in the 
background). 
46 See, e.g., 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 (2011) 
[hereinafter NIMMER] (“In determining whether given conduct constitutes copyright infringement, 
the courts have long recognized that certain acts of copying are defensible as ‘fair use.’”). 
47 Id. at § 13.05[A][1][b] (discussing the 9th Circuit’s labeling the doctrine of “productive use,” 
holding that ‘mere reproduction of a work in order to use it for its intrinsic purpose’ may not be 
considered fair use). 
48 Id. (“Unless there is a ‘productive use’ in the sense that the copier himself is engaged in 
creating a work of authorship whereby he adds his own original contribution to that which is copied, 
the [9th Circuit] Court of Appeals held that the defense of fair use may not be invoked.”). 
49 See OECD REPORT, supra note 2, at 8. 
50 Id. 
51 See, e.g., Rob Walker, Mash-Up Model, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/20/magazine/20wwln-consumed-t.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss 
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have surfaced to describe these new forms of “re-creativity.”  As noted, these forms of 
re-use are the subjects of dispute in the copyright arena.54 
2. An Uncertain Legal Environment for UGC Creators 
Although the most prominent disputes are between the economic goliaths, 
namely the media industry and technology companies,55 the threat of litigation and 
the prohibitory effects of current copyright provisions are also felt by the UGC 
creators themselves. 
For the downstream creator who re-uses existing works, there is a lack of any 
guidance or a clear legal right to re-create copyrighted works.56  The legal 
environment is not only murky, it is also hostile.  Laws now criminalize individuals 
for copyright infringement for downloading infringing UGC and prematurely 
preempt potential fair uses through DRM, TPM, and ACL provisions.57  Emboldened 
by these laws, copyright owners have also developed practices and processes that 
increasingly discourage UGC creators from uploading material onto the WWW, some 
of which are heavy-handed and without proper legal foundation.58 
The most prominent example of this is the case of Lenz v. Universal Music 
Corp.,59 which is illustrative of the endemic problem of a protectionist copyright 
regime.  This case was brought by a UGC creator against a copyright owner and 
makes a statement about the latter’s role and responsibility in the statutory “notice-
and-take-down” process.60  Its implications on internet intermediaries like YouTube 
                                                                                                                                                 
(discussing the potential for an infringement lawsuit for musical artist “Girl Talk” who creates 
albums by sampling sections of popular songs and mixing them together to form new tracks).   
52 See Sarah Trombley, Visions and Revisions:  Fanvids and Fair Use, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 647, 649 (2007) (explaining the the use, editing and re-invention of copyrighted videos and 
music to produce fan videos for various potential purposes such as to change the storyline, for 
critique, to summarize and as parody). 
53 Id. at 658; Zachary Lazar, The 373-Hit Wonder, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2011, at MM38 
(explaining that a ‘mash-up’ is a remix or sample created by combining parts or components of more 
than one piece of music, for example lyrics and melody). 
54 See, e.g., Walker, supra note 51 (labeling Girl Talk as a “lawsuit waiting to happen.”). 
55 See, e.g., Viacom Int’l Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(claiming that “tens of thousands of videos on YouTube, resulting in hundreds of millions of views, 
were taken unlawfully from Viacom's copyrighted works without authorization). 
56 See 1 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 3.01 (discussing the confusion and subjective nature of what 
constitutes a derivative work). 
57 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006) (prohibiting circumvention of technological measures). 
58 See, e.g., Emma Carmichael, We Need Youth Baseball Teams to Reenact MLB Highlights for 
us Because MLB Hates its Fans (and Probably Children, too), DEADSPIN (Apr. 18, 2011, 1:40 PM), 
http://deadspin.com/#!5793065/we-need-youth-baseball-teams-to-reenact-mlb-highlights-for-us-
because-mlb-hates-its-fans-and-probably-children-too (explaining how the sports blog has attempted 
to post videos of MLB games and they have continually received takedown notices). 
59 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
60 Id. at 1151–53.  See also 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).  Under Title II of the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (“DMCA”), online service providers are given safe harbor protection against copyright 
liability if they meet the requirements of the provisions (i.e. fall under any category of eligible 
Internet intermediaries) and adhere to the requirements of the provisions including the “notice-and-
take-down” process.  Id.  Under the process, if the intermediary receives a notification claiming 
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are incidental but still of particular interest.  Mainly, this case shows the uncertain 
and hostile legal environment in which user-creators operate. 
The case involved the plaintiff, Stephanie Lenz who had made a home video of 
her thirteen-month-old son dancing to Prince’s song “Let’s Go Crazy” but only posted 
a twenty-nine second clip of the video on YouTube.61  The defendant, Universal 
Music, the owner of the copyright to the song, sent a notice to YouTube demanding 
that the video be taken down in accordance with the DMCA.62  YouTube complied 
with the request and notified Lenz, who in turn sent a counter-notice to have the 
video reposted citing fair use, which YouTube also complied with.63  Lenz, then sued 
Universal claiming misrepresentation under the DMCA, seeking a court declaration 
that her use was non-infringing.64 
On August 20, 2008, a U.S. federal district court ruled that copyright holders 
cannot order the removal of a digital video file available online, which in this case 
was uploaded onto YouTube, without first determining whether the posting 
constituted fair use of the copyrighted material contained therein.65  The court’s 
decision is a significant statement on the operation and status of the U.S. fair use 
doctrine, the limits of the “notice-and-take-down” process and the responsibilities 
relating to such a process on the copyright holder.  The good faith requirement is 
judged from the perspective of the copyright owner who must make an effort to 
evaluate the fair use defense in any given case.66  If the copyright owner uses a 
mechanical procedure or automatically gives notice without considering fair use, then 
bad faith claims can be made.67  This should be reflected in the notice.68 
                                                                                                                                                 
infringement from a copyright holder, or its agent, they must block access or remove the allegedly 
infringing material.  There is a counter-notification provision for users to have the material in 
question “put-back”.  Id. 
61 Stephanie Lenz, “Let’s Go Crazy” #1, YOUTUBE (Feb. 7, 2007), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N1KfJHFWlhQ (exemplifing the struggle over who should bear 
the greater burden in policing real copyright infringement online); see Steven Seidenberg, Copyright 
in the Age of YouTube:  As User-Generated Sites Flourish, Copyright Law Struggles to Keep Up, 95 
A.B.A. J. 46, 47 (2009).  
62 See Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1152. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 1154, 1156 (holding that a copyright owner who seeks to enforce a DMCA notice-and-
take-down request must first “consider the fair use doctrine in formulating a good faith belief that 
‘use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, 
or the law’”). 
66 Id. at 1156 (explaining that a “full investigation” is not required, pursuant to precedent from 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., Inc., 391 F.3d 1000, 1004 
(9th Cir. 2004)).  The subjective “good faith” evaluation is assessed from the copyright holder’s 
perspective, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) (2006).  Id. 
67 Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1153 (accusing Universal of misrepresentation under § 512(f), 
among other allegations); see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (providing that “any person who knowingly 
materially represents . . . that material or activity is infringing . . . shall be liable for any damages, 
including cost and attorneys’ fees, incurred by [anyone] injured by such misrepresentation.”).  
Section 512(f) is designed to prevent abuse of DMCA take-down notices.  Id. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v). 
68 Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1154–55.  Lenz’s “bad faith” argument hinged on the requirements 
for a “take-down” notice as elaborated in 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i–vi), which essentially provides a 
checklist for the information that needs to be included.  Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(v) 
(specifying that such notice must include “[a] statement that the complaining party has a good faith 
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The case highlights the difficulties in apportioning the policing responsibility 
between the parties (to achieve a balance of convenience and fairness), the potential 
for abuse of the “notice-and-take-down” process, as well as the burden of manual and 
subjective policing of UGC platforms.  It also illustrates the difficulties faced by UGC 
creators against zealous copyright claims, since Lenz is more the exception than the 
norm when it comes to reactions to the DMCA notice process. 
III. CONSTRAINTS OF FAIR USE 
A.  The Jurisprudence of Fair Use and New Media 
1. The Three Phases of Fair Use Development 
The first phase in the legal development of the U.S. fair use doctrine dates back 
to its inception as a counterweight to copyright protection.69  Its earliest incarnation 
was as a legitimate action-based form of protection for “fair abridgment.”70  It has 
since evolved to encompass many forms of uses including, and in particular, 
derivative works.71  This carve out of otherwise exclusive rights for the derivative use 
of existing works without authorization continues to be relevant, especially with the 
growing emphasis on re-creativity and re-invention.72 
The second significant phase in the development of fair use relates to the advent 
of technology with the social utility and benefits of mechanical and electronic 
duplication.  This milestone was defined by the Supreme Court in Sony Corp. of Am. 
v. Universal City Studios.73  In that case, the Court found that fair use was a defense 
for the technological inventors and intermediaries who provided facilitative devices 
to their customers, who in turn could use those devices for infringing purposes.74 
The invention of the internet, WWW, and increasingly efficient wireless 
electronic communications, storage and transfer of technology heralds a whole host of 
new media technology that has given rise to the third phase for fair use 
development.75  It has also given rise to other significant forms of statutory carve-
                                                                                                                                                 
belief that use of the material in the manner complained of is not authorized by the copyright owner, 
its agent, or the law”).  Broad objections in principle to online posts without reference to context do 
not suffice.  Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1155. 
69 See 4 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 13.05. 
70 See Gyles v. Wilcox, (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 490. 
71 See 4 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 13.05[A][1][b]. 
72 See, e.g., What is Creative Commons?, CREATIVE COMMONS ORG., 
http://wiki.creativecommons.org/images/3/35/Creativecommons-what-is-creative-commons_eng.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 30, 2012).  The Creative Commons suite of licenses encourages copyright owners to 
loosen the rights over their works so as to render third party re-use legal.  Id. 
73 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
74 Id. at 498–99 (explaining that a manufacturer of a product is not liable for contributory 
infringement as long as the product is "capable of substantial noninfringing uses). 
75 Matthew Sag, God in the Machine:  A New Structural Analysis of Copyright’s Fair Use 
Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 381, 404 (2005). 
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outs such as safe harbor protections and purpose-specific statutory exemptions, 
which were necessary to cope with societal changes and needs.76  This third phase of 
development also covers the UGC phenomena and the devolvement of creativity, 
especially follow-on creations to the masses. 
It is this third stage that this paper is concerned with and proposes that the 
legislature play an increased role in the development of limitations to rights in 
creative works.  These changes should even extend beyond the confines of fair use, 
however flexible the doctrine has proven to be and despite its continued importance 
and relevance as a defense. 
 
2. The Basic Tenets of Fair Use 
The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that copyright law serves two primary 
objectives:  “to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for their 
labors” and “motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors . . . in order to 
benefit the public.”77  The public benefit consideration encapsulates the overarching 
public interest and social utility concerns.78  Fair use as a defense is an “equitable 
rule of reason” to serve as a salve to the strict copyright regime.79  It allows third 
parties to develop and further enhance earlier copyrighted works without otherwise 
having to seek permission from the copyright owner to do so if certain conditions are 
met.80  It remains a flexible and evolving standard, and as such is versatile while 
unpredictable.81 
The fair use defense has seen its fair share of judicial activism.  For instance, 
the types of factors considered in analyzing fair use in the U.S. have expanded, and 
its protections have extended to protect the development of new technologies and 
practices that have become acceptable in society.82 
                                                                                                                                                 
76 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006) (creating a safe harbor for online service providers against 
copyright liability if they adhere to and qualify for certain prescribed guidelines like the notice-and-
takedown provision). 
77 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985). 
78 Id. at 559.  
79 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (1976); see Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984). 
80 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (recognizing the importance 
of relaxing exclusive rights to allow works that build upon, reinterpret, and re-conceive existing 
works to avoid “stifling the very creativity which the law is designed to foster.”); Fisher v. Dees, 794 
F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that the fair use doctrine “creates a limited privilege in those 
other than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without 
the owner’s consent”). 
81 See MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 299 (LexisNexis, 4th ed. 2005) 
(“The factors are broadly stated, overlapping, and vague, and the legislative history provides little 
insight as to their meanings, what weights to give them, or how they interrelate.”); Pierre N. Leval, 
Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1110–11 (1990). 
82 See generally Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1525, 1586–1614 (2004) (explaining the trend of fair use in cases after Sony Betamax 
attests). 
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3. Problems with Fair Use 
One problem with the fair use doctrine is the fact that the enumerated list of 
fairness factors constitutes considerations that were more relevant in a non-digital 
context and the pre-internet society, thus less relevant in the UGC context.83  
Although fair use does extend as a defense to alleged indirect, contributory or 
secondary infringers,84 the doctrine faces several inadequacies in application.  The 
enumerated fair use factors are currently focused on primary infringement and from 
the perspective of the copyright owners’ interests.85  Hence, the recent judicial 
developments of additional and novel tests to supplement these factors have 
primarily emerged from U.S. jurisprudence and many of which were in direct 
response to technological progress.86 
There is also some confusion in attributing the beneficial outcome of the UGC 
service to end-users and society at large in the assessment of the relevant factors and 
tests in favor of the service provider.87  Potential user-creators can also be deterred 
                                                                                                                                                 
83 See L. Ray Patterson, Folsom v. Marsh and Its Legacy, 5 INTELL. PROP. L. 431, 446–51 
(1998) (explaining that the four factors of analysis for fair use derive from the opinion of Joseph 
Story in Folsom v Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841), in which the defendant had copied 353 
pages from the plaintiff's twelve volume biography of George Washington in order to produce a 
separate two-volume work of his own). 
84 See Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining that secondary 
liability (i.e., contributory and vicarious copyright infringement) requires proof of direct 
infringement).  Because of this association, fair use is also relevant to secondary claims and has 
indeed been put to the test in technology-related cases involving internet intermediaries.  Id. 
85 See, e.g., Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 818–20, 834 (2010) 
(providing examples of proposals for analyzing “technological fair use”, which is a re-working of the 
fair use factors that take into account the special characteristics and considerations relevant to 
“speech technologies”, but are still within the context of the fair use exception). 
86 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 419 (1984) (weighing the 
fair use argument concerning the Betamax home video recorder); A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, 
L.L.C., 562 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2009) (considering an internet service which stores digital copies of 
student research papers); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 815–816 (9th Cir. 2003) (examining a 
web search system which returned search inquiries with thumbnail pictures); Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. 
Supp. 2d 1106, 1111 (D. Nev. 2006) (performing a fair use analysis on a search engine’s “cache” function, 
which stored versions of websites accessed by the search engine algorithm); Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1155–1156 (9th Cir. 2007) (discussing a search engine which could 
display images in thumbnail and full size formats in response to user’s queries). 
87 See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 442–48 (illustrating that the substantial “non-infringing uses” test 
takes into consideration the statistical and empirical evidence of usage by end-users, and the 
benefits to such users through time-shifting of content, in assessing the usefulness and fairness of 
allowing the recording device); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579 (illustrating that although 
the nature of the usage is related to the change in purpose and utility of the original subject matter 
(i.e., the “transformative use” test), the ultimate objective is also the benefit to users and to society, 
which was also relevant to the determination in favor of the defendant there); see also Kelly, 336 
F.3d at 818–19 (noting the difficulty copyright law has with cases in which the alleged infringement 
involves retransmission of the underlying work through a different technological medium); Perfect 
10, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 722 (9th Cir. 2007) (weighing the value of the alleged 
infringing service to the public); CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 
339, para 64 (Can.) (stating that the provision of the service by the intermediary was a “necessary 
condition” and “part of the process” to achieve the end-user’s objective and the outcome that is the 
time-shifting of programs, where the fair dealing defense was available to the copyist even though 
the actual use of the work copied for the relevant purpose was by another).  It may be added that 
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from creating UGC even if it could fall within the scope of fair use, because of threats 
of legal action, including long drawn out disputes and high legal fees.88  The greater 
uncertainty and unpredictability of the fair use approach is, the greater the problem. 
4. Looking Beyond Fair Use—Proposed Statutory Limitation Provision 
Fair use is the foremost, but by no means the only, statutory carve-out to restrict 
liability for copyright infringement.89  Today, there are also purpose-based statutory 
exemptions that protect against primary liability90 and safe harbor laws to protect 
intermediaries from secondary infringement.91  The emerging importance of 
supplementary statutory protections and exemptions to the fair use exception serve 
several purposes.  First, they provide certainty and reduce unnecessary disputes 
where there is a need to address and legitimize specific activities and entities, 
especially where they are identified as having important socio-cultural and economic 
benefits that outweigh copyright protection.92  Next, they obviate the need to resort to 
the slower evolution of the law through judicial law making in the common law 
system.93  Statutory protections, exceptions, and exemptions also have the advantage 
of predictability and automatic applicability.  This offers an almost instantaneous 
solution to the problems and conflicts posed by developments in the digital age and 
technological advances that often provide the impetus for significant amendments to 
copyright legislation to accommodate these changes.94 
Many academics have rightfully criticized the preemptively chilling and 
prohibitive effects of “digital locks,” namely, DRM, TPM, and ACLs.95  Although 
internet users are becoming more sophisticated, they still generally lack the technical 
                                                                                                                                                 
technology creators of editorial software and other instruments that permit users to create and re-
create works should also form part of the process that facilitate the development and distribution of 
UGC. 
88 See, e.g., Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2008) 
(threatening to sue several internet service providers). 
89 See 4 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 13.05. 
90 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2006) (detailing purpose-based copyright exemption for libraries 
and archives). 
91 See, e.g., id. § 512(c) (providing immunization to online service providers that might 
inadvertently host infringing material uploaded by users). 
92 See, e.g., id. § 512(f) (creating liability for copyright owners who improperly issue a take 
down notice for infringement). 
93 Henry N. Butler, A Defense of Common Law Environmentalism, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
705, 724, 727 (2008). 
94 See, e.g. CONG. BUDGET OFF., COPYRIGHT ISSUES IN DIGITAL MEDIA 14 (2004), available at 
http://www.cba.gov/ftpdocs/57xx/doc5736/08-09Copyright.pdf (noting that the growth of technology is 
“outpacing” U.S. copyright law, despite Congress’s attempts to pass legislation addressing the 
changes).  
95 Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle:  Disaggregating Fair Use from the 
Dmca’s Anti-Device Provisions, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111, 147–48 (2005).  In many instances, 
however, an individual could commit an offence by circumventing a TPM to do something that the 
individual has the right to do under the Copyright Act.  See 17 U.S.C. § 1201.  Digital rights 
management (“DRM”) techniques allow copyright owners to restrict access to and/or use of 
copyright-protected expression automatically without distinction for fair use exceptions and other 
statutory exemptions. 
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know-how and technological skills to get around these measures even if it is to 
perform a fair usage.96  Also, despite the Lenz case, individual users generally lack 
the resources and knowledge to defend themselves from threats of copyright action, 
which would allow legitimate fair uses to be preemptively blocked.97 
Meanwhile, current practices seem to show that copyright owners automatically 
give notice of infringement irrespective of the nature of the use, and at least some 
internet intermediaries tend to err on the side of caution in order to protect itself 
from copyright liability.98  This is also done to ensure that statutory safe harbor 
protections extend to them by subsequently blocking or removing what may actually 
be legitimately posted UGC.99  Developing a specific and defined statutory exception 
or exemption will also be an important step towards incorporating UGC as an 
exception to the effects of DRM and ACL.100 
The default position for UGC should be one of non-infringement unless proven 
otherwise and it should not be left to the individual user, with his or her limited 
resources, to prove non-infringement.  The burden of proof should be on the 
complainant copyright owner to prove that there was ‘net infringement’ (i.e., 
infringement and no legitimate statutory limitation) in the case concerned.101  To be 
fair, as fair use is a judgment and merit-based assessment and involves a case-by-
case analysis, it would be quite burdensome for the copyright owners to make this 
                                                                                                                                                 
96 See Rebecca Tushnet, I Put You There:  User-Generated Content and Anti-Circumvention, 12 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 889, 905 (2010); Darren A. Handler, The Copyright & Digital 
Mismanagement Chasm:  Fair Use Implications of Digital Rights Management Technologies Upon 
the Digital Versatile Disk Medium, 7 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 173, 176 (2007); JESSICA 
LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT:  PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON THE INTERNET 125–26, 
135–36, 144–45 (Prometheus, 2d ed. 2006); Jerome H. Reichman et al., A Reverse Notice and 
Takedown Regime to Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 981, 1035 (2007); Bill D. Herman & Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Catch 1201:  A 
Legislative History and Content Analysis of the DMCA Exemption Proceedings, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 121, 135–38 (2006); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy:  
Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 551 
(1999). 
97 See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, NATIONAL, CASEBASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY 2 (Oct. 2009), 
available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file/dissurv1.pdf (stating that after 
excluding certain cases, such as ones that do not involve discovery and prisoner rights cases, the median 
litigation costs for the defense of a federal civil dispute was $20,000); see also CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET 
AL., INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES:  2010 5 (Sept. 2010) 
(estimating median household income in the United States to be below $50,000 per year). 
98 See Michael S. Sawyer, Filters, Fair Use & Feedback:  User Generated Content Principles 
and the DMCA, 24 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 363, 366 (2009). 
99 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c). 
100 See In the Matter of Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection 
Systems for Access Control Technologies, No. RM 2008-08, Comment on the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation, 2–12 (Dec. 2, 2008), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2008/comments/lohmann-fred.pdf. 
101 See Warren Chik, Better a Sword than a Shield:  The Case for Statutory Fair Dealing/Use 
Right as Opposed to a Defence in the Light of the Disenfranchising Effect of Digital Rights 
Management and Anti-Circumvention Laws, 1 INT’L J. OF PRIVATE L. 157, 175 (2008).  Users will 
retain the burden of proving non-infringement for protection under the general fair use exception 
unless and until changes are also made to that position, such as through the recognition of stronger 
user rights vis-à-vis fair use.  Id.  Another possible reform is to statutorily provide a procedure for 
users to seek a declaration of fair use.  Id. 
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assessment.102  This was a point made by the defendant in the Lenz case.103  Thus, a 
more specific and explicit statutory limitation provision should help alleviate this 
burden by clarifying what types of UGC related activity are allowed.104  This 
limitation provision would also lend greater weight, legitimacy and authority to these 
UGC activities.  Moreover, the existing DRM, TPM, and ACLs along with the notice-
and-take-down process should also be amended to accommodate UGC following the 
enactment of a statutory UGC limitation provision.105 
The follow-on effect of legally permitted UGC and an explicit statutory UGC 
limitation are also very important because complaints are currently brought against 
UGC platforms that cultivate and promote UGC.  As indirect infringement actions 
are reliant on the existence of primary infringement, carving-out UGC will have the 
effect of legitimizing such technologies, thus shielding them from threats of legal 
action and provide an environment conducive for the development of such technology 
and services.106 
IV. CRAFTING A STATUTORY UGC LIMITATION 
“You don’t pay love back; you pay it forward.” 
In the Garden of Delight, 1916107 
A. Justifications for a Statutory Carve-Out 
This section explains the justification for statutory protections for UGC and 
proposes a model that meets a certain set of conditions or pre-requisites.  The 
objective of the recommended model of statutory limitation or copyright ‘carve-out’ is 
to recognize UGC and re-use as a legal and legitimate form of utility.  It aims to 
provide at least a legal presumption in favor of certain categories or types of use 
emerging from user customs on the internet, provided that other necessary 
requirements and safeguards are met.  Non-statutory precedents such as proposed 
draft legislation, private undertakings and best practices are canvassed for 
                                                                                                                                                 
102 Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1155–56. 
103 Id. 
104 See, e.g., id. (providing an example of a sanction for groundless threats of legal action based 
on copyright infringement for acts that fall within clear and specific statutory exceptions or 
exemptions).  A fine or an injunction from using the DRM or TPM are two examples of such 
sanctions. 
105 In relation to the former, law reform should also look into accessible technical means to 
legitimately circumvent such measures.  Methods such as a user declaration procedure to obtain a 
“digital key” can be instituted to overcome the problem of “digital locks” that do not distinguish 
between infringing and legal uses (i.e. anti-circumvention provisions that prohibit all circumvention 
technological tools without distinction as to its use).  With regard to the latter, it is interesting to 
note the merits of the proposed “notice-and-notice” process in the Canadian Bill C-32 (infra note 
141). 
106 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 437–42 (1984). 
107 LILY H. HAMMOND, IN THE GARDEN OF DELIGHT 209 (Thomas Y. Crowell ed., 1916). 
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inspiration.  Similarly, common UGC practices are examined in the proposed 
limitation. 
1. Public Interest Justifications 
Conducting an analysis based on a utilitarian model, the optimal point of 
utilization of a work does not end with the protection of original creations.  It goes 
beyond that to include secondary forms of creations that build upon those materials, 
and that extend the interest in and enjoyment of the original works.  Many forms of 
UGC, especially those that have a different purpose from the original, add intangible 
value to the work, reach a different audience, and serve a different set of objectives.  
The increased distribution and retention of such works also extend and prolong its 
social benefits (i.e., sustaining its utility through continued interest and enjoyment). 
Even taking into consideration the potential market impact on the copyrighted 
works, the net returns from legally protecting a carefully defined group of UGC from 
copyright infringement is greater than if no such exclusion is made.  The type of UGC 
that should enjoy protection should of course be limited in such a way that the moral 
and economic returns to the original author is minimally affected. 
Other legal theories can also be interpreted as largely supporting re-use,108 
especially when viewed in the context of society as a whole.109  The concept of 
marginal utility in economics also supports the idea of utility gaining from an 
increase in consumption, through re-invention and re-interpretation of existing 
works, albeit at a diminishing rate.  The greater the reach and the more utilization 
that can be made of a work, the greater the utility that can be gained from it.110 
Given the socio-economic utility of UGC and its contributions to human 
interaction, re-invention, and the dissemination of knowledge, both the technology 
behind it and the source of such content should be given value and offered some 
protection.  Due to the nature and subject of UGC, however, it is difficult for creators 
to seek the permission currently required from copyright owners before lawful use of 
                                                                                                                                                 
108 E.g., Natural rights theory can be interpreted as supporting re-use.  See John Locke, Of 
Civil Government, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 269–78 (Peter Laslett ed., 1967) (explaining 
the theory of transformative labor); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression:  Equality 
and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1556 (1993). 
109 See Blaise Pascal, Preface to the Treatise on Vacuum, in THE HARVARD CLASSICS (Charles 
W. Elliot ed., O. W. Wright trans., 1909-14), available at http://www.bartleby.com/48/3/10.html.  
“But as subjects of this kind are proportioned to the grasp of the mind, it finds full liberty to extend 
them; its inexhaustible fertility produces continually, and its inventions may be multiplied 
altogether without limit and without interruption . . . .”  Id. at ¶ 10.  “As their perfection depends on 
time and pains, it is evident that although our pains and time may have acquired less than their 
labors separate from ours, both joined together must nevertheless have more effect than each one 
alone.”  Id. at ¶ 12.  “[N]ot only does each man advance from day to day in the sciences, but all 
mankind together make continual progress in proportion as the world grows older, since the same 
thing happens in the succession of men as in the different ages of single individuals.  So that the 
whole succession of men, during the course of many ages, should be considered as a single man who 
subsists forever and learns continually . . . .”  Id. at ¶ 21. 
110 John Tehranian, All Rights Reserved?  Reassessing Copyright and Patent Enforcement in the 
Digital Age, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 45, 51 (2003). 
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their work.  Moreover, the difficulties of copyright licensing as a feasible or 
reasonable alternative for users requires a fundamental shift in the rights protection 
regime if UGC is to be allowed to perpetuate. 
The public interest goals of UGC are multifaceted and encompass existing public 
and social interest considerations.111  One goal is the maximization of social wealth in 
knowledge and information as well as the promotion of social interactivity.112  Citizen 
journalism on blogs and online media platforms as well as user collaboration 
platforms like Wikipedia contribute to the diversity in the source of information, the 
quantity of information, the dissemination, accessibility, and sharing of knowledge, 
and an overall a greater spectrum of views that top-down reporting from a few 
industry sources fail to provide.113 
The next public interest goal involves human rights interests, particularly free 
speech and self-expression, political and artistic truth, and free press.114  Through 
the efficiency of peer production,115 there is greater democratization of access to and 
source of information as well as more transparency through a greater diversity of 
sources, opinions, views, and perspectives.116  For example, UGC websites that allow 
forms of commentary or promote discussion can help achieve these goals. 
UGC also acts as a ‘social leveler’ as anyone with a computer and internet access 
has the same powers of spreading and obtaining information.117  Greater access to 
and sharing of information and knowledge on UGC platforms also has an educational 
and archival role.  By extending the life of information through the evolving and re-
cycling of materials, this can prolong the lifespan and enjoyment of all types of 
content.118 
Another goal includes the other intangible and tangible benefits, which include 
the creation of new forms of social ordering and interaction for social life enrichment.  
This includes the development of business and social relationships beyond the 
confines of physical proximity such as through social networking websites like 
                                                                                                                                                 
111 See OECD REPORT, supra note 2, at 28–39 (explaining the economic and social impact of 
UGC, which is overwhelmingly positive). 
112 Id. 
113 Cultural hegemony, which is prevalent with traditional media is not endemic to UGC with 
its diversity of sources, especially for the discerning reader that can reach their own conclusions and 
select or sieve through the volume of content for quality and accuracy.  In fact, another category of 
UGC—group-based aggregation – can also help to perform and fulfill this function. 
114 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (stating that copyright law “contains built-
in First Amendment accommodations.”); see also Sonia Katyal et al., Fair Use:  Its Application, 
Limitations and Future, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1017, 1022 (2007). 
115 See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 
369, 381 (2002) (defining the term “peer production” as the “production by peers who interact and 
collaborate without being organized on either a market-based or a managerial/hierarchical model”). 
116 Id. at 440–41. 
117 There are, of course, still limitations depending on the jurisdiction and the level of content 
regulation in any country as well as on the accessibility to computer resources and internet access, 
especially in poorer countries and less computer-literate societies. 
118 See Damien O’Brien & Brian Fitzgerald, Mashups, Remixes and Copyright Law, 9 
INTERNET L. BULLETIN 1, 17–19 (2006) (creating an understanding of the impact that Australian 
Copyright Act on various forms of online creativity, specifically mash-ups and remixes). 
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Facebook and Google+.119  Moreover, creators can also build their reputation, 
autonomously or independently develop a career and hone their skills through UGC 
by using video and music sharing platforms like YouTube and MySpace, for example. 
These justifications will influence the legal definition of UGC that will 
determine the eligibility requirements for copyright limitation as well as the 
purposes that will play a role in it. 
2. Private Interest Justifications 
The copyright equilibrium in the apportionment and distribution of rights 
involves balancing the interests of individual users and copyright owners as well as 
UGC technology innovators and internet intermediaries.120  As users become more 
empowered by the UGC tools provided by UGC technology creators, suppliers, and 
distributors, there is a change in context that should also translate to copyright 
law.121  This involves redrawing the boundary between proprietary copyrights and 
the digital commons.  For this reason, a relatively moderate and incremental 
approach will still be preferred, and the proposed exclusion should not apply to all 
UGC but only to those that fulfill a certain criteria.  The reasons for those criteria 
will be given after the UGC limitation is introduced in this paper. 
It should be noted at this point that public and private interests may overlap 
and their considerations are not mutually exclusive, especially since many private 
interests factor into the public interest analysis.122  As explained, the tangible and 
intangible benefits of derivative works, whether sole adaptations or a collective 
combination or mash-ups of several works apply to and go beyond individual 
interests.123 
                                                                                                                                                 
119 See Mark Millan, Google Says Social Network has 90M Users (Jan. 19, 2012), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2012-01-19/tech/tech_social-media_google-plus-users_1_search-engine-social-
network-results-pages?_s=PM:TECH.   
120 See Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 102 Eng. Rep. 139, 140 (“[W]e must take care to guard against 
two' extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of ability, who have employed their time for the 
service of the community, may not be deprived of . . . their just merits, and the reward of their 
ingenuity and labor; the other that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress 
of the arts be retarded.”); see also Samuelson, infra note 236. 
121 See Warren B Chik, ‘Customary Internet-ional Law’:  Creating a Body of Customary Law for 
Cyberspace. Part I:  Developing Rules for Transitioning Custom into Law, 26 COMPUTER L. & SEC. 
REV. 1, 3–22 (2010); Warren B Chik, ‘Customary Internet-ional Law’:  Creating a Body of Customary 
Law for Cyberspace. Part II:  Applying Custom as Law to the Internet Infrastructure, 26 COMPUTER 
L. & SEC. REV. 185, 185–202 (2010) (demonstrating that “customary internet norms” and the “new 
global social consciousness” that users hold towards the predominant form and purpose of re-use 
inherent in UGC should be instructive in identifying ‘digital norms’). 
122 As noted, the increase in the pool of potential adapters coupled with the innovative and 
technological instrument to perform that function as well as to distribute and share the re-creation 
will contribute to the optimal usage and advantages that can be derived from it by society as a 
whole; more so than if the protectionist attitude towards original work is perpetuated by a strict 
copyright regime. 
123 See, e.g., Walker, supra note 51 (discussing the mash-ups by the group, “Girl Talk”). 
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B. Non-Statutory Precedent Considerations 
As mentioned, non-statutory precedents such as proposed draft legislation, 
private undertakings, and best practices provide the inspiration for the UGC 
provision proposed in this paper.  Each of these considerations is discussed in the 
following sections. 
1. UGC Principles, Guidelines, and Studies 
While copyright owners deserve reward and recognition for their works and as 
incentives for creativity, it is not always necessary to provide them the full social 
value of their work, especially where other valid interests and benefits can be gained 
from freeing the restrictions on their works.124  In certain cases, this balance is 
recognized even by the stakeholders themselves leading to attempts at private 
compromises within the framework of the law. 
One notable initiative that purportedly attempts to reconcile the interests of 
UGC technology services with industry copyright owners, and to identify some 
general guidelines on the rights and responsibilities of the former in its practices, are 
the Principles for User Generated Content Services (“UGC Principles”)125 that were 
issued on October 18, 2007 by several of the world’s leading internet and media 
companies.126  Notable among the UGC Principles are self-regulatory guidelines, 
which place a duty on the UGC services to include intellectual property policy 
statements and terms of use (as preemptive measures); implement filtering 
technology and upgrade it when commercially reasonable (as preventative measures); 
and regularly find and actively remove infringing content discovered by either party 
(as remedial measures).127 
In return for these undertakings, the participating copyright owners undertake 
not to bring an infringement action against services that practice “good faith” 
adherence to these responsibilities.128  Also, fair use has been recognized as an 
                                                                                                                                                 
124 See Shubha Ghosh, The Fable of the Commons:  Exclusivity and the Construction of 
Intellectual Property Markets, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 871–72 (2007). 
125 Principles for User Generated Content Services:  Foster Innovation. Encourage Creativity. 
Thwart Infringement, DISNEY ENTERS., INC., http://www.ugcprinciples.com/ (last visited Jan. 30, 
2012) [hereinafter UGC Principles]; see also Alan N. Braverman & Terri Southwick, The User-
Generated Content Principles:  The Motivation, Process, Results and Lessons Learned, 32 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 471, 471–72 (2009) (explaining the motivation behind the UCG Principles); Anon, The 
Principles for User Generated Content Services:  A Middle-Ground Approach to Cyber-Governance, 
121 HARV. L. REV. 1387, 1287–88 (2008) (explaining the middle ground approach to governing cyber 
space, adopted by some of the leading commercial copyright owners). 
126 See generally Press Release, UGC Principles, Internet and Media Industry Leaders Unveil 
Principles to Foster Online Innovation While Protecting Copyrights, DISNEY ENTERS., INC., (Oct. 18, 
2007), available at http://www.ugcprinciples.com/press_release.html. These companies include CBS 
Corp., Dailymotion, Fox Entertainment Group, Microsoft Corp., MySpace, NBC Universal, Veoh 
Networks Inc., Viacom Inc., and The Walt Disney Company.  However, they clearly exclude the top 
echelon of Internet companies like Google, Facebook, YouTube as well as the involvement of civil 
society. 
127 Id. 
128 See UGC Principles, supra note 125, at ¶¶ 3, 14. 
[11:240 2011] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 262 
 
important exception and it is an expressly stated exclusion to filtering technology and 
copyright enforcement.129  The copyright owners undertake to “accommodate fair use” 
when sending notices and making infringement claims,130 and when applying 
“identification technology” and exercising manual review.131  However, as an initial 
attempt at self-governance, the UGC Principles suffer from many flaws and fail to 
address the root cause of the UGC problem and the concerns of the UGC users. 
There are many criticisms.  The first main criticism is that the most important 
and influential UGC platforms and services, including YouTube and Facebook, were 
not involved in drawing up the UGC Principles either because they were not engaged 
or declined to join the effort, perhaps because they do not accept the agreement with 
its arguably copyright owner-centric wording.132  Second, users and civil rights 
groups were also not consulted and are likely to have the same concerns as UGC 
intermediaries, and they are the main subject of UGC creation and dissemination.133  
Third, the UGC Principles are only a private arrangement between the signatories 
that form only a small percentage of the stakeholders in the global creative industry 
as a whole; and if users are included into the equation, then the significance of the 
Principles will be even smaller.134 
As noted, the main intention and tenor of the UGC Principles is the protection of 
copyright ownership.135  Because the burden of policing and identifying infringing 
content is on the UGC platforms, this presents yet another concern.136  Additionally, 
although there is language on accommodating fair use, there is no real solution 
offered as to how this could be done through current technology.137 
                                                                                                                                                 
129 Id. at ¶ 3(d). 
130 Id. at ¶ 6. 
131 Id. at ¶¶ 3(d)–(f).  This means that they will develop blocking technology in such a manner 
that it that will not filter out fair use content.  However, the possibility of creating such a technology 
that can apply fair use doctrine is doubtful, especially one that does not filter out a good amount of 
such content.  See, e.g., Sawyer, supra note 98, at 366 (explaining that UGC sites appear to be 
implementing filters and erring on the side of caution). 
132 See Press Release, supra note 126 (listing participating companies which does not include 
Facebook and YouTube). 
133 See UGC Principles, supra note 125 (stating the groups who were consulted in drafting the 
Principles - Private users and civil rights groups were not included in this group).  In fact, users may 
be even less protected from threats of direct infringement action if actions against the UGC services 
themselves are less frequent and the UGC platforms have less incentive to advocate their right.  
They may also be legally bound by the UGC Principles if the Principles are incorporated into the 
terms of service. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at ¶ 1. 
136 Id. at ¶ 3 (explaining procedures for using content identification technology, used to identify 
infringing material). 
137 The former should be required, by way of sanction, not to prevent lawful purposes and the 
latter should not make it an offence to circumvent (and to facilitate or provide) a TPM for lawful 
purposes.  As noted, many academics have criticized these provisions and some have proposed 
amendments to the law to the same or similar effect.  However, as it is currently drafted, there 
appears to be no fair use exception to the digital locks provisions under the DMCA (as there is for 
copyright infringement) except for the few defined exceptions.  Hence, the possibility of 
incorporating an exclusion in the form of a purpose-specific statutory exemption for UGC may, at 
this stage, be a more realistic solution. 
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In response to the perceived bias towards copyright protection in the UGC 
Principles, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (“EFF”) among other public interest 
groups produced and proposed a set of “Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video 
Content” (“Fair Use Principles”).138  The Fair Use Principles seek the cooperation of 
all the parties, particularly copyright owners and UGC services, to preserve and 
accommodate fair use in their practices rather than to create technological filters 
that implement a stricter reading of what constitutes fair use.139  It provides more 
guidance, in the form of supplementary guidelines, on how UGC services can fulfill 
their stated commitment to respect fair use for UGC.140 
While reliance on good faith and on the current fair use doctrine does not resolve 
the issues concerning UGC, the fact that these UGC and Fair Use Principles are even 
produced by the relevant stakeholders indicate that there is genuine concern that the 
current copyright law provisions are inadequate. 
2. The Statutory UGC Exception Proposal in Canada 
Draft legislation from other jurisdictions provides guidance for future proposals.  
One such precedent from Canada provides inspiration for the UGC provision this 
paper proposes. 
A proposal to amend the Canadian Copyright Act was tabled on June 2, 2010 in 
the Canadian Parliament (“Bill C-32”).141  Among the proposed amendments that 
were a mixture of pro-copyright and pro-user provisions, Bill C-32 included proposed 
fair dealing limitations.  It also included purpose specific exemptions for education, 
time-shifting, format-shifting, the making of back-up copies of legally acquired 
content, the development of interoperable programs, encryption research, network 
security testing, and technological processes.142  The proposed provision that is of 
interest is the provision for a UGC exception.  Although Bill C-32, like other proposed 
Canadian copyright amendment bills, did not crystallized into law, its proponents are 
still optimistic for a breakthrough in the future.143 
The use of existing copyright-protected works in the creation of new works for 
non-commercial purposes, subject to certain restrictions, was proposed as an 
                                                                                                                                                 
138 See Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 31, 
2007), http://www.eff.org/issues/ip-and-free-speech/fair-use-principles-usergen [hereinafter Fair Use 
Principles]. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 An Act to amend the Copyright Act, R.S.C 2010, c. C-32 [hereinafter Bill C-32]. 
142 Id. 
143 See Ferne Downey, Copyright Reform Vital to Artists, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 6, 2009, at A19 
(noting the failure of previous copyright amendments, namely Bills C-60 and C-61 in 2005 and 2008 
respectively); see also Giuseppe D’Agostino, There is No Two Without Three:  Bill C-32 is Dead, IP 
OSGOODE, (Dec. 5, 2011, 12:21 PM), http://www.iposgoode.ca/2011/03/there-is-no-two-without-three-
bill-c-32-is-dead/ (noting that Bill C-32 failed to make it out of committee); Richard J. Brennan, 
Copyright:  Consumer Versus Artists, TORONTO STAR, May 31, 2010, at A6 (“Clearly what we want to 
do is have a copyright law that makes sense for everyday consumers.  It also has to make sense for 
creators.  There is always a balance.”). 
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exception from copyright liability in section 29.21 of Bill C-32.144  The benefit of a 
general provision, like section 29.21, is that all categories of UGC are potentially 
covered and they are not limited to certain types of uses.  It is for the court to decide 
on a case-by-case basis on the eligibility of the UGC and its creator to the exception. 
Bill C-32 also proposed fair dealing exemptions for parody and satire, which 
together with other relevant uses like commentary, could also fall under the scope of 
the UGC provision.145  Hence, there may be some overlap in the exceptions. 
The proposed amendment under Bill C-32 also included a different and more 
moderate approach to the copyright monitoring and complaint filing procedures.146  
Unlike the “notice-and-take-down” procedure that the U.S. utilizes, section 41.25 of 
Bill C-32 proposes a “notice-and-notice” approach.147  Under this system, the 
copyright owner must notify the intermediary internet providers of possible piracy on 
the part of their customers.148  The intermediary would in turn be required to notify 
the customer of the possible violation of the law.149  The customer’s personal 
information could then be released to the copyright holder with a court order for the 
dispute to be resolved in a court of law if the customer defies the notice.150 
The responses to the proposal have been mixed with the usual reactions from 
the various stakeholders.151  Predictably, copyright owners such as the Alliance of 
                                                                                                                                                 
144 Bill C-32, § 29.21(1). 
(1) It is not an infringement of copyright for an individual to use an existing work 
or other subject-matter or copy of one, which has been published or otherwise 
made available to the public, in the creation of a new work or other subject-matter 
in which copyright subsists and for the individual—or, with the individual’s 
authorization, a member of their household - to use the new work or other subject-
matter or to authorize an intermediary to disseminate it, if 
(a) the use of, or the authorization to disseminate, the new work or other subject-
matter is done solely for non-commercial purposes; 
(b) the source—and, if given in the source, the name of the author, performer, 
maker or broadcaster - of the existing work or other subject-matter or copy of it 
are mentioned, if it is reasonable in the circumstances to do so; 
(c) the individual had reasonable grounds to believe that the existing work or 
other subject-matter or copy of it, as the case may be, was not infringing 
copyright; and 
(d) the use of, or the authorization to disseminate, the new work or other subject-
matter does not have a substantial adverse effect, financial or otherwise, on the 
exploitation or potential exploitation of the existing work or other subject-
matter—or copy of it—or on an existing or potential market for it, including that 
the new work or other subject-matter is not a substitute for the existing one. 
Id. 
145 See Bill C-32, § 29 (“Fair dealing for the purpose of research, private study, education, 
parody or satire does not infringe copyright.”) (emphasis added). 
146 Id. § 41.25. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. §§ 41.25–41.26; see also Gervais, supra note 39, at 448 (“As a normative matter, it makes 
sense to allow this aspect of the internet to flourish by using ex post controls (such as the proposed 
notice and notice) and providing safe harbors, rather than ban the activity completely.”) (citations 
omitted). 
149 Bill C-32,  §§ 41.25–26. 
150 Id. 
151 Compare Jordan Timm, Germans Win through Sharing, CANADIAN BUSINESS, Sept. 14, 
2010, at 16 (noting that Bill C-32 has been “[c]alled by some a sellout to corporate interests and a 
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Canadian Cinema, Television and Radio Artists (“ACTRA”) were against the 
provision.152  They argued that it would take away economic and moral rights from 
creators.  Alternatively, other stakeholders such as the Canadian Federation of 
Students (“CFS”) specifically supported the proposed provision to “legali[z]e practices 
that are already commonplace.”153 
It remains to be seen if these recommended amendments will eventually be 
passed into law,154 and if so, whether they will remain in this form.  If these 
amendments had been passed into law, Canada would have been the first country to 
provide statutory protection for UGC.  As it stands, the U.S. remains the only 
country with some form of protection for UGC in general under its fair use 
exception.155 
3. Customary Norms 
Customary norms often influence many areas of law.156  In some areas of law, 
particular customs, usages, and social practices are considered in developing 
                                                                                                                                                 
surrender to Washington”) with Kate Taylor, The Middle-Class Copyright War, GLOBE AND MAIL, 
Sept. 3, 2011, at F5 (noting that “for those who live off publisher’s advances, royalties or freelance 
fees, the alternative schemes that are presented sound mainly like fantasies driven by unlikely 
subscriptions, intrusive advertising, or worse yet, donations from an online audience.”). 
152 See Press Release, Alliance of Can. Cinema, Television and Radio Artists, Bill C-32 Update: 
Canadian Content—Free Today, Gone Tomorrow (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.actra.ca/main/press-
releases/2010/11/bill-c-32-update-canadian-content-free-today-gone-tomorrow.  Stating that: 
Bill C-32 makes it legal for Canadians to remix creative content into new works. 
This mash-up provision could allow third party providers, such as Youtube, to 
benefit financially from these creations but fails to compensate creators, all the 
while trampling on their economic and moral rights. No other country in the 
world has a law like this that gives away creators’ rights . . . . 
Id. 
153 See Maintaining the Balance, CAN. FED’N OF STUDENTS SUBMISSION 5 (Jan. 2011), 
http://www.cfs-fcee.ca/html/english/campaigns/CFS-Submittion_C-32_Copyright_Modernization.pdf. 
(recognizing the importance of existing practices and attitudes towards UGC and the increasing 
acceptance of its legitimacy irrespective of their legal status); id. at 3 (recommending also a non-
exhaustive list of categories for the fair dealing provision in line with the U.S. fair use exception). 
154 See Jessica Murphy, New Copyright Bill to Duplicate C-32:  Tories, TORONTO SUN (May 17, 
2011), http://www.torontosun.com/2011/05/17/new-copyright-bill-to-duplicate-c32-tories; Karen Bliss, 
Canadian C-32 Copyright-Reform Bill Dies (Again) with Election Call, BILLBOARD.BIZ (Mar. 28 
2011), http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry/global/canadian-c-32-copyright-reform-bill-dies-
1005097402.story (showing how politicized the issue of copyright amendment is). 
155 See, e.g., Steven Hetcher, User-Generated-Content and the Future of Copyright:  Part-Two—
Agreements between Users and Mega-Sites, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 829, 840 
(2008) (“Certainly, in principle, if cases involving much of this UGC were litigated, there would 
likely be many instances in which the creators would prevail in a fair use argument.”); but see 
Trombley, supra note 52, at 684 (noting that some UGC would likely fail the four part fair use 
analysis, but that courts should still not find infringement in these cases). 
156 See, e.g., Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1)(B), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0 (“The Court, whose function is to 
decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall 
apply . . . international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”). 
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standards or tests that often evolve into common law.157  It has a role to play in 
identifying “implied terms” under contract law,158 the application of the “reasonable 
man test” in tort law159 and determination of “common law marriage” in family 
law.160  Thus, custom can have a central role to play in the development of the law 
and legal norms. 
Some academics have argued for the greater utilization of common usage and 
practices in the development of IT law.161  User behavior and attitude in cyberspace 
is an interesting study since patterns of activities can be empirically derived and 
examined.162  Especially in the case of UGC where the users are the drivers of 
creation, the conventions surrounding UGC together with the increasing recognition 
of user rights under the copyright regime should result in the legitimization and 
legalization of UGC.163 
There is already a groundswell of opinion from academics, practitioners, civil 
rights organizations, and even lawmakers that users should be given greater rights 
in the form of freedom of access to and use of creative works.  As noted, the EFF has 
been one such watchdog for user rights.  Similarly, the Creative Commons Movement 
driven by a leading academic in this field, Lawrence Lessig, has sought to promote a 
culture of sharing and re-use of copyrighted works within the existing copyright 
framework.164  Meanwhile, the free software, free culture and open source 
movements have likewise preceded and paved the way for a culture of sharing.165 
                                                                                                                                                 
157 See, e.g., RETSTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965) (“Unless the actor is a child, the 
standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable man 
under like circumstances.”). 
158 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1981) (“[I]ntention to make a promise may 
be manifested in language or by implication from other circumstances, including course of dealing or 
usage of trade or course of performance.”). 
159 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (providing standard of conduct). 
160 See, e.g., Rutkin, Family Law and Practice, Ch. 1-4B, § 207 (Matthew Bender) (providing 
that “[p]arties to a marriage prohibited under this section who cohabit after removal of the 
impediment are lawfully married as of the date of the removal of the impediment”). 
161 See Chik, Customary Part I, supra note 121, at 13–15. 
162 E.g., “web analytics” is the study through collection, measurement, analysis and reporting 
of Internet data in order to understand and optimize web usage.  Of course, such studies are also 
suitable for Schools of Information Systems and Technology as well as other fields of scholarship 
such as within the Social Science category for the study of human behavior and society. 
163 RecordTV Pte Ltd v MediaCorp TV Singapore Pte Ltd, [2010] 2 SLR 152, para. 114 (Sing.) 
(“A construction of the copyright law in a manner that leads to widespread unenforceability would 
only serve to undermine the very regime upon which copyright relies”); see also John Tehranian, 
Infringement Nation:  Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 543 
(2007) (noting that the emergence of new technologies has made the average American citizen a 
copyright infringer). 
164 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX:  MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID 
ECONOMY 254–73 (Penguin, 2008) (recommending the removal or deregulation of noncommercial 
amateur re-use from copyright law and the simplification copyright law for greater clarity for users, 
including easily understood exemptions to complement fair use); see also WARREN CHIK & GIORGOS 
CHELIOTIS,  TAKING STOCK OF THE CREATIVE COMMONS EXPERIMENT:  MONITORING THE USE OF 
CREATIVE COMMONS LICENSES AND EVALUATING ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF CREATIVE 
COMMONS AND FOR COPYRIGHT LAW, 35TH RES. CONF. ON COMM. INFO. AND INTERNET POL’Y 1, 33 
(Sept. 29, 2007). 
165 See, e.g., OECD REPORT, supra note 2, at 12 (noting that there are probably 200 million 
pieces of content on the internet that are under various Creative Commons licenses).  At the 
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The courts in various jurisdictions have also become more sympathetic to user 
rights.  For example, the Supreme Court in Canada took a strong stance on user 
rights in the seminal case of CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Canada.166  
Even the holding in Lenz considered the users’ fair use as more of a right than an 
exception.167  Just like customary internet law stems from the attitudes and practices 
of online users,168 the assessment of lawful user-generated activities should stem 
from the acceptance of common UGC practice. 
Daniel Gervais has noted in one of his theses that there is an “[element of social 
behavior passed on through generations in a culture], with a strong built-in feedback 
loop, that many forms of UGC are ‘acceptable’ within undefined parameters.”169  This 
‘new morality’ or ‘global social consciousness’ of users towards UGC can be used to 
determine what is acceptable and should be legalized.170  The parameters of 
acceptability should be defined by the established practices and attitudes of users.171  
The development of principles and guidelines by the relevant stakeholders can also 
                                                                                                                                                 
extreme, certain socio-political organizations and websites like Pirate Parties International and 
Pirate Bay take things further by attempting to subvert copyright law by appealing to populist 
notions of internet and online freedom. 
166 CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Soc’y of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339. 
167 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 150, 1154 (N.D. Cal. 2008).  Concluding 
that: 
the plain meaning of ‘authorized by law’ is one permitted by law or not contrary to 
law.  Though Congress did not expressly mention the fair use doctrine in the 
DMCA, the Copyright Act provides explicitly that ‘the fair use of a copyrighted 
work is not an infringement of copyright.’  Even if Universal is correct that fair 
use only excuses infringement, the fact remains that fair use is a lawful use of 
copyright. 
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, 433 (1984) (“Anyone . . . who makes a fair use of the work is not an infringer of the copyright 
with respect to such use.”); Chik, supra note 101, at 169–79 (drawing a distinction between a right 
and a defense and issues pertaining thereto). 
168 See Chik Customary Part I, supra note 121, at 3–22 (detailing how empirical study of user 
attitudes and practices could be accomplished); Chik Customary Part II, supra note 121, at 185–202 
(making recommendations about the rules and principles that could be adopted for lawmaking based 
on customary Internet law as a source of law). 
169 Daniel J. Gervais, The Tangled Web of UGC:  Making Copyright Sense of User-Generated 
Content, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 841, 853–54 (2009).  Gervais also notes the complication of 
what constitutes “private use” with regards to UGC and hosting platforms where private creations 
and re-creations can be disseminated to a whole spectrum of recipients: 
[T]he disconnect between social and legal norms lies in the blurring of the 
private/public distinction.  We can conclude from this analysis that traditionally 
there were two distinctions:  one between private and public use, and another 
between professional and amateur use.  The technological environment until 
approximately the year 2000 meant that the two different distinctions overlapped; 
amateur meant private and professional meant public.  The shift from one-to-
many to many-to-many dissemination modes destabilized this system, and 
amateur no longer meant private.  Normatively, the question is this: should 
amateur use prevail over public use when the two realms are separated? 
Id. at 855–56. 
170 See id. 
171 Customary internet law is therefore also important in order to relieve the disjuncture 
between changing morality and the law. It is also important not to criminalize large segments of 
society that are otherwise law-abiding citizens. See, e.g., supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
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influence the direction and development of customs as well, insofar as it reflects the 
consensus of the majority.172  Gervais also noted that “[w]hether a court will . . . give 
legal effect to such practice is unclear.  It would make sense, however, to consider 
implied consent if the practice in question can be linked to the copyright holder or if 
it can be shown that it is commonplace within its industry.”173 
Debora Halbert distinguishes the active “cultural producer” (user-creator) from 
the erstwhile passive “cultural consumer” (end-user) in relation to UGC and 
describes the former phenomenon as “a culture of the masses” taking power and 
control of technology and making culture.174  It may be an overstatement that 
internet users are taking control of technology, as it is the technology creators, UGC 
intermediaries and technological platforms that are molding the evolution of UGC 
culture and influencing user behavior behind the scenes.  However, the UGC creators 
are certainly harnessing the powers of the technologies and services that are made 
available to them in creating a culture producing movement.175 
4. Identifying Customary UGC Practices 
The expansion of a fair use-type of protection to non-commercial derivative 
works of third parties that involve more than mere copying has been proposed before.  
That type of a proposal was based on the same utilitarian arguments set forth above 
that the re-use of copyrighted works can benefit society and, even to some extent, the 
copyright owner.  This benefit would be accomplished through continued or increased 
interest and exposure of their works, which can offset any detriment from such 
use.176  The rise of the public interest in, and social benefits of, UGC makes the 
argument even more compelling for the unbundling of this exclusive right and the re-
apportionment of rights through statutory exclusions. 
Indeed, it is important that more empirical studies are made into the usages 
relating to UGC and the rapidly emergent customary norms, through user behavior 
and attitudes to UGC, in order to craft a fair set of rights.  One such study was 
conducted by the American University School of Communication’s Center for Social 
Media (“CSM”) in January 2008 where the main types of purpose relating to UGC 
                                                                                                                                                 
172 Compare UGC Principles, supra note 125 with Fair Use Principles, supra note 138 (arguing 
for improvements automated content filtering, “take-down” notices, and a procedure by which users 
may challenge the removal of their content). 
173 Gervais, supra note 169, at 868.  The question remains as to what extent the lack of 
sustained and “persistent objection” on the part of the copyright owners to certain UGC practices 
reinforces a practice as a custom (i.e. a valid exception/exemption), and if so, to what extent such 
objection can constitute a source of customary norm (e.g. “implied consent”). 
174 See Debora Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses:  A Manifesto for User-
Generated Rights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 921, 959 (2009). 
175 Id. at 960–61 (proposing a manifesto by users and the copyright critics to support what she 
describes as a UGC ‘movement,’ which can be an expressed as a manifestation of the developing 
attitudes, shifting social consciousness, and morality towards the re-use culture and is symbiotic to 
the notion of user custom as a source of Internet law and norms). 
176 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Creative Reading, 70 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 175–76 (2007) 
(proffering the Star Wars and Star Trek franchises as examples of how fan-based creative works can 
enhance the popularity of the original works). 
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were identified.177  The Program on Information Justice and Intellectual Property 
(“IIJIP”) and the CSM also produced a set of code of best practices in fair use 
specifically for creators of online video.178 
Some types of UGC are already widely recognized statutory exceptions under 
fair use or exemptions as stand-alone provisions.  These types include commentary, 
parody and satire, albeit in a more generalized context.179  Newer forms of UGC 
include, but are not limited to, home videos, tribute videos, fan fiction, music mash-
ups, and remixes.180  Whether there are already general limitations for such 
purposes, the categories of usual purposes for which UGC are created should 
collectively be incorporated into the list of common uses that fall within the general 
description of UGC for a statutory formulation of UGC exclusion from infringement.  
Extending the existing purposes, which may or may not already be the subject of a 
statutory exclusion, to a specific UGC limitation provision is a natural progression 
that recognizes the changing contexts of usage. 
5. Fairness 
Fairness remains a fundamental consideration under the proposed statutory 
UCG carve-out.  It is not accurate to say that the Canadian Bill C-32 model or the 
model proposed in this paper permits UGC as legally defined “without reference to 
the tempering effect of ‘fairness.’”181  It is true that there is no mandated or 
recommended list of factors that helps determine the fairness of use, as in the case of 
the fair use exception.  However, the fairness of uses in relation to UGC can be 
carefully built into the very definition of the UGC provision, which must be fulfilled 
in order for the exception or exemption to apply.182  Thus, if the conditions are 
established, the use should be deemed fair.  Also, the nature and effect of certain 
purposes can also constitute fair usage provided that the other statutory conditions 
are met as well. 
                                                                                                                                                 
177 AM. UNIV. CTR. FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, RECUT, REFRAME, RECYCLE:  QUOTING COPYRIGHT 
MATERIAL IN USER-GENERATED VIDEO 5 (Jan. 2008), available at 
http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/fair-use/best-practices/online-video/recut-reframe-recycle 
[hereinafter CSM Report] (listing nine main categories of uses of copyrighted works for UGC). 
178 See AM. UNIV. CTR. FOR SOCIAL MEDIA, CODE OF BEST PRACTICES IN FAIR USE FOR ONLINE 
VIDEO 5–8 (June 2008), available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/bestpractices (identifying 
six kinds of unlicensed uses that may be considered fair, including:  commenting or critiquing of 
copyrighted material; use for illustration or example; incidental or accidental capture of copyrighted 
material; memorializing or rescuing of an experience or event; use to launch a discussion and 
recombining to make a new work, such as a mash-up or a remix, whose elements depend on 
relationships between existing works). 
179 See Notice of Final Rule, supra note 24, at 43826. 
180 See, e.g., OECD REPORT, supra note 2, at 15 (listing various types of user generated content 
and providing examples of each). 
181 Andrea Rush, What Anna Karenina Might Have Said About Copyright Qualifications Under 
Canadian Law, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 667, 669 (2010). 
182 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 108–112, 117, 119, 121–122 (2006) (listing purpose-specific statutory 
exemptions that are the counterpart to the fair use or fair dealing factors). 
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C. The Formulation of a Proposed Statutory UGC Defense 
The legislature will have to consider what allocation of rights is fair before 
determining the appropriate solution.  This is because the extent of the protection 
accorded is dependent on whether the limitation is in the form of a general exception 
or specific exemption.  For that reason, this paper presents two options.  Option one 
is a more ‘liberal’ open-listed general UGC exception while option two is a more 
‘conservative’ closed-listed purpose-specific UGC exemption. 
For the purpose of this paper, especially this section, “exception” will be used to 
describe a wider and more amorphous form of limitation closer to that of the flexible 
fair use test while an “exemption” is closer to the more predictable fair dealing and 
other purpose-specific model of limitation.  In actuality, the options are hybrids that 
fall somewhere in between the sliding scale marked at both extremes by the current 
fair use exception on the one side and existing restrictive purpose-specific exemptions 
on the other side. The options will collectively be referred to as a statutory 
“limitation” (or “carve-out,” “exclusion,” or “protection”) for UGC.  
The formulation of the statutory protection from infringement should be 
determined by three Ps:  profile; process; and purpose.  These three “Ps” should form 
the pre-requisites for the two options for a UGC limitation provision. 
1. Option One—A General UGC Exception 
User Generated Content 
Section X. 
(1) User Generated Content shall not constitute copyright infringement. 
 
(2) User Generated Content are works created by a person or a group of persons:  
consisting of any combination of one or more [existing] [copyrighted] works, whether 
or not with original material; in a manner that is transformative; as an amateur or in 
a non-professional capacity; and for a non-commercial purpose. 
 
(3) For the purpose of this section, works that shall be [deemed] [presumed] to be 
transformative under subsection (2) shall include works for the following purposes: 
(a) Commentary; 
(b) Parody and satire; 
(c) Pastiche or collage; 
(d) Personal reportage or diaries; 
(e) Re-interpretations; 
(f) Incidental use; and 
(g) Information and knowledge sharing. 
 
(4) For the purpose of this section, references to [existing] [copyrighted] works 
include other [existing] [copyrighted] subject-matter. 
 
Option one is a moderate option in between the open concept of the U.S. fair use 
doctrine and an exhaustive list of purpose-specific exemptions.  Thus, subsection (2) 
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provides for the conditions to be fulfilled before UGC can avoid direct liability for 
infringement.  These conditions are based on a core set of common characteristics of 
UGC that provides a fair balance of interest between the stakeholders.  Because of its 
specificity, however, it may not cover every type of UGC. 
This option also provides a list of the most customary forms of UGC in 
subsection (3) based on the use of existing works or other subject-matter that have 
been identified by studies.183  Because the list under subsection (3) is non-exhaustive, 
the judges can incrementally and gradually expand the boundaries of this exception 
to include other purposes, which can expand to other categories of uses or purposes.  
This will involve a smooth evolution and build-up of the law in this area.  The list of 
purposes is not merely illustrative, as the further choice between a deeming and 
presumptive effect will determine the standard of proof and where the burden of 
proof lies in showing the ‘transformativeness’ of use or purpose. 
2. Option Two—Purpose-Specific UGC Exemption 
User Generated Content 
Section X. 
(1) The use of [existing] [copyrighted] works for the purpose of:  
(a) Commentary; 
(b) Parody and satire; 
(c) Pastiche or collage;  
(d) Personal reportage or diaries; 
(e) Re-interpretations; 
(f) Incidental use; and 
(g) Information and knowledge sharing, 
shall be [deemed] [presumed] transformative and is not an infringement of copyright 
provided that the requirements in subsection (2) are met. 
 
(2) User Generated Content are works created by a person or a group of persons 
for any of the purposes under subsection (1) consisting of any combination of one or 
more [existing] [copyrighted] works, whether or not with original material; as an 
amateur or in a non-professional capacity; and for a non-commercial purpose. 
 
(3) For the purpose of this section, references to [existing] [copyrighted] works 
include other [existing] [copyrighted] subject-matter. 
 
A more conservative approach to incorporating a UGC limitation would be to 
render the list of identified purposes exhaustive thereby making it a purpose-specific 
exemption, while requiring proof of the other usual pre-requisites based on core UGC 
                                                                                                                                                 
183 See, e.g., CSM Report, supra note 177, at 5 (listing the following as typical types of UGC: 
parody and satire; negative or critical commentary; positive commentary; quoting to trigger 
discussion; illustration or example; incidental use; personal reportage or diaries; archiving of 
vulnerable or revealing materials; pastiche or collage”); OECD REPORT, supra note 2, at 15–16 
(listing sixteen different types of UGC). 
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characteristics.  The activities that are permitted are listed and categorized based on 
the legitimacy of purpose, which also determines the transformative issue.  
Therefore, the UGC creator must first show that the work was used in the course of 
any of the purposes set out in subsection (1) before he/she can go on to prove the 
requirements under subsection (2).  Based on such a legislative intent, the only way 
that the category of eligible purpose-based UGC can expand is through legislative 
amendment.  This lengthy process will likely lead to a more gradual development 
than option one. 
National legislative approach as well as international law-making platforms 
such as within the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and World Intellectual 
Property Organization (“WIPO”) can incrementally allow for a greater combination of 
exclusive rights and carve-outs.  These limitations can be amended from time to time, 
but their reaction time will often be slow and will require greater effort and political 
will. 
3. The Basic Requirements 
UGC can be the outcome of an individual endeavor or collaboration.184  
Collaborative works appear on platforms such as wikis and other text-based 
cooperative portals (e.g. Wikipedia), group-based aggregation websites (e.g. Digg and 
del-icio-us) and open source projects (e.g. the Linux operating system, Mozilla Firefox 
and the Apache platform).185  It is also common for audio-visual and video content 
that are commonly uploaded to multi-media sharing platforms.186  Thus, this is not a 
pre-requisite but rather an acknowledgement that UGC can be the result of a 
collaborative effort and that such works should also be eligible for statutory 
protection. 
UGC may be re-formatted for compatibility with the system support of a 
particular platform, but it should not be substantively or substantially edited by an 
intermediary or any other third party.  Otherwise, it may become the work of 
another.187 
a. Combination of Works (“Process”) 
The essence of UGC is that it can be a combination of several existing works, an 
original take of an existing work or both.188  It can also incorporate original elements 
by the UGC creator.189  This definition refers to the derivative forms of UGC and not 
merely copied works.190  It would apply, for example, to mash-ups and remixes.191  
                                                                                                                                                 
184 See, e.g., OECD REPORT, supra note 2, at 16 (listing examples of distribution platforms for 
UGC). 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 See 4 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 13.01. 
188 See OECD REPORT, supra note 2, at 4, 12. 
189 See 4 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 13.01. 
190 Id. 
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Because of the conditions set out here that are particular to UGC, the remainder of 
derivative rights rests with the copyright owner, thus it does not fully negate the 
exclusive right to make derivative works in this regard. 
UGC may have the possible effect of diluting the commercial value in the 
existing work (i.e., the commercial exploitation of derivative works such as the 
production of sequels, adaptations, translations, and an abridgment and the 
profitability in syndication).192  However, there are also benefits of exposure that can 
have the opposite effect of equalizing or even actually increasing the net value in the 
work.193 
Substantiality of the taking of existing works should generally not be an issue, 
especially where the UGC utilizes many changes, or the use is quantitatively or 
qualitatively less central to the UGC work as a whole.  For example, a collective work 
or a compilation of works, such as a “best of” tribute or a megamix, could also 
constitute UGC, so long as the new work does not merely combine entire pieces of 
existing work.194  Nonetheless, the “transformative use” requirement will also factor 
in and outweigh considerations of substantiality of taking. 
b. Transformative Use (“Purpose”) 
The transition from passive user-consumer to a top-down model of cultural 
production for creative works have undergone a swift radical evolution to an active 
user-consumer model.  This includes peer sharing and information dissemination 
across platforms,195 collaborative tagging, and social classification.196  The ‘social 
engineering’ technologies generally fall under the umbrella of “social software” 
applications.197  In short, re-creativity is not new,198 but the context of UGC and the 
way it is “democratized” through the use of networked digital technologies is new.199 
                                                                                                                                                 
191 See e.g., Walker, supra note 51 (demonstrating how Girl Talk created and marketed its 
latest mash-up made from the combination of existing works, without fear of a lawsuit). 
192 See, e.g., Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 117–18 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(discussing dilution and how exploiting the works, in this case a similar trademark, of another can 
negatively effect the commercial value of the original). 
193 See CSM Report, supra note 177, at 6–10 (providing examples of how re-using content can 
add value).  This is one of the justifications in favor of a UGC limitation and together with the other 
factors that have been canvassed outweigh the possible net detriment to the copyright owner. 
194 This is an example of an area where intermediaries can play a part in moderating use and 
limiting the possibility of abuse of existing works.  For example, YouTube limits the length of the 
video clips that can be uploaded and filtering technologies are developed to weed out potentially 
infringing materials. 
195 See, e.g., Sharethis, http://sharethis.com/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) (providing example of 
social bookmarking method).  Other more traditional methods of social bookmarking include 
hyperlinking, deeplinking and in-line linking. 
196 See Tal Z. Zarsky, Assessing Alternative Compensation Models for Online Content 
Consumption, 84 DEN. U.L. REV. 645, 709–10 (2006) (discussing “folksonomies,” a system of 
collective and collaborative classification or indexing by users through the creation and management 
of tags to annotate digital content). 
197 Id. at 711. 
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The most significant achievements and outcome of this socio-cultural 
renaissance in the WWW are in the form of secondary expression, peer sharing and 
information dissemination.200  The former relates more to a derivative work with a 
different and perhaps incidental purpose from the original work.  Alternatively, the 
latter relates more to the methods of transmission, broadcast and dissemination.201 
Even the creative industry has not exactly been placid and some have jumped 
onto the UGC bandwagon through different avenues and techniques.  For example, 
some uses are more directly related to online advertising, including uploading of 
trailers on YouTube, while others use more subtle methods such as viral marketing 
campaigns, mash-up, or remix competitions.202 
i. Transformative Use Under the Fair Use Exception 
The transformative use test has undergone several stages of development to deal 
with new situations since it was introduced into law in 1994.  In the seminal case of 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,203 the U.S. Supreme Court established that even 
a blatant commercial parody could constitute fair use, as long as it is sufficiently 
transformative.204 
The transformative use test has been used to protect fair uses by alleged 
primary infringers (i.e., users) for re-creations for purposes different than that of the 
existing work used.205  The fair use test has also been applied to protect fair uses by 
alleged secondary infringers (i.e., internet intermediaries) for purposes different from 
                                                                                                                                                 
198 Graham Reynolds, A Stroke of Genius or Copyright Infringement?  Mashups and Copyright 
in Canada, 6 SCRIPTED 534, 642 (2009) (noting that “early versions of mashups have existed for 
decades”). 
199 See Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users:  Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation 
Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 562 (2000). 
Technology now makes possible the attainment of decentralization and 
democratization by enabling small groups of constituents and individuals to 
become users—participants in the production of their information environment—
rather than by lightly regulating concentrated commercial mass media to make 
them better serve individuals conceived as passive consumers. 
Id. at 562. 
200 See HENRY JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE:  WHERE OLD AND NEW MEDIA COLLIDE 2–4 
(N.Y. Univ. Press, 2006); HENRY JENKINS, FANS, BLOGGERS, AND GAMERS:  MEDIA CONSUMERS IN A 
DIGITAL AGE 134–36 (N.Y. Univ. Press, 2006). 
201 See generally OECD REPORT, supra note 2, at 44–47 (differentiating derivative works from 
original works on the context of UCC). 
202 Id. at 5, 12, 34. 
203 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
204 Id. at 574.  Neither permission nor payment is required for the right to make the parodied 
song, although payment would be required for the right to perform it. 
205 See e.g., 4 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 13.05[A][1][b] (describing the history and evolution of 
the productive use, as it relates to the purpose and character of the use element in the fair use 
analysis). 
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that of the original work, for example to achieve an archiving function,206 and 
cataloguing function in the form of image search engine indexing.207 
The test was formulated in the context of the fair use doctrine and as a 
supplementary consideration to the four explicitly listed factors.208  The most 
significant fair use factor is the first factor, where a new work is examined by how 
“transformative” it is in relation to the existing work upon which it is partially 
based.209  The creation of transformative works has been seen as “at the heart of the 
fair use doctrine’s guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright.”210  
Transformative use is important to the survival of modern technologies as 
exemplified by the outcome in the Google images search cases.211  “[It] is central to 
the creation of many virtual objects through modification and collaboration.”212  Even 
though the fair use analysis involves a balancing of all the factors, in cases where 
transformative use features, it tended to be the pivotal determinant.213 
Non-substitution of the existing work and its market through the use of the 
work for a different purpose (i.e. the “re-purposing” of content) can constitute 
‘transformativeness.’ Hence, the use for critical discussion of unpublished 
materials,214 the use of a work as part of a biographical account,215 and other 
purposes that do not relate to the ‘borrowed’ work have constituted transformative 
fair use.  This is the reason for linking transformative use to the categories of most 
customary purposes relating to UGC in the proposed provisions. 
ii. Transformative Use Under the UGC Limitation Provision 
The very essence of transformative use in support of UGC does not fall far from 
the original meaning of transformative use as it appeared in earlier literature, and as 
                                                                                                                                                 
206 See, e.g., Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1118–19 (D. Nev. 2006) (finding that 
Google’s practice of caching webpages was a fair use). 
207 See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
reproduction of ‘thumbnail’ images for web search indexing was a fair use); Perfect 10, Inc. v. 
Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 734–35 (9th Cir 2007) (finding that Google’ use of thumbnail 
images was a fair use). 
208 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 581 (usurping the fair use factors in priority and weight as the 
Court considered the transformative factor as carrying more weight than the others). 
209 Id. at 587–88. 
210 Id. at 579. 
211 See Kelly, 336 F.3d at 822; Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 734–35. 
212 Todd David Marcus, Fostering Creativity in Virtual Worlds:  Easing the Restrictiveness of 
Copyright for User-Created Content, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 67, 88 (2007) (noting that “because of the 
nature of the type of creation virtual worlds enable, the transformative factor should weigh more 
heavily than in an ordinary analysis”). 
213 See Campbell 510 U.S. at 581 n.14 (noting that less weight is accorded to other factors 
where significant transformativeness is found). 
214 See, e.g., NXIVM Corp. v. The Ross Institute, 364 F.3d 471, 480 (2d Cir. 2004) (taking the 
publication status of the underlying work into consideration in a fair use analysis). 
215 Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 609 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding 
the unauthorized use of copyrighted concert posters to be sufficiently transformative). See also, 
Warren Publishing Co. v. Spurlock, 2009 WL 2412542 (E.D.Pa. 2009). 
[11:240 2011] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 276 
 
it was adopted and applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose.216  
In that case, the Court stated that a use is transformative if it “adds something new, 
with a further purpose or different character, altering the first [work] with new 
expression, meaning, or message.”217  The users’ right to “rework [copyright-
protected] material for a new purpose or with a new meaning” has been 
recommended in the 2006 Gowers Review of Intellectual Property in the United 
Kingdom (“U.K.”). on the subject as well.218  Such a right of creation also includes the 
incidental right to disseminate such works.219 
Originality is a requirement for copyright protection and is also a factor in any  
transformative use assessment.220  The purpose of the use can give rise to a high 
likelihood of originality in a work.221  The change in purpose or meaning of a work is 
a transformative use that usually requires a modification of the original copyrighted 
works.222  For example, the changes made to an existing work or the extraction of the 
work in question for parody or for critical comment constitute transformative use.223  
A mere repackaging or republication of a copyrighted work is unlikely to succeed, 
                                                                                                                                                 
216 See Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative:  Fair Use and Reader Response, 31 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 451–52 (2008) (noting that Judge Leval coined the term “transformative” 
in the fair use context); see also Leval, supra note 81, at 1111 (defining transformative use as 
requiring that “[t]he use must be productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different 
manner or for a different purpose from the original”). 
217 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). 
218 ANDREW GOWERS, GOWERS REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 66 (Nov. 2006), available 
at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/pbr06_gowers_report_755.pdf [hereinafter GOWERS REVIEW] (recommending that 
the U.K. government take steps to create a copyright exception for transformative use, because the 
so-called “rework material” can create “new meaning,” “new value,” and “new markets”). 
219 See 17 U.S.C. §106 (2006).  The public nature of its sharing distinguishes UGC from 
personal use. 
220 See Mary W. S. Wong, "Transformative" User-Generated Content in Copyright Law:  
Infringing Derivative Works or Fair Use?, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1075, 1087–88 (2009) 
(discussing issues regarding the level of originality that should be required for UGC).  However, 
originality will remain a pre-requisite for UGC to itself gain copyright protection, even for user-
derived content where the proposed form of protection will be proposed to be lowered. 
221 See, e.g., Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. 
J.L. & ARTS 467, 488–89 (2008) (noting several cases in which creators changed nothing in the 
underlying work, yet the courts’ found no infringement due to the purpose of the defendant’s usage). 
222 See, e.g., Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1144 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(discussing the requirement of conceptual separability when analyzing useful work that is re-
created into a creative work). 
223 Leval, supra note 81, at 1111. 
If, on the other hand, the secondary use adds value to the original - if the quoted: 
matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information, 
new aesthetics, new insights and understandings - this is the very type of activity 
that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of society. 
Transformative uses may include criticizing the quoted work, exposing the 
character of the original author, proving a fact, or summarizing an idea argued in 
the original in order to defend or rebut it.  They also may include parody, 
symbolism, aesthetic declarations, and innumerable other uses. 
Id. 
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especially if it can be mechanically and automatically performed without human 
intervention or judgment.224 
In summary, the re-working of different types of copyrighted works through 
various methods and in different degrees for a new purpose or meaning generally 
constitutes transformative use.225  Whatever the case, it must involve some 
modification or alteration of existing works, even if it may be contextual.226 
There are good reasons to include a list of UGC categorized by their objectives 
that have been identified as the most common purposes of UGC to date into a 
statutory UGC limitation.  This is especially relevant if the scope of the protection is 
required to be restrictive, relative to the fair use doctrine, and in line with 
international legal obligations, like the Berne Convention.227 Additionally, they 
constitute value-added as they offer additional pleasure and different interests 
generated in the re-work.228  Because these user objectives are distinct from the 
original purpose of the work, the transformative use requirement is satisfied.229 
iii. Transformative Use:  Deemed or Presumed? 
There are two additional choices for consideration under the two options 
previously proposed that relate to the transformative use requirement.  One 
additional choice is that the listed purposes can, by their very nature, be considered 
transformative and as such they may be deemed transformative.  This choice will 
provide certainty and predictability, based on an objective assessment.  However, it 
does not allow the judges to consider the quality of the content and the intentions of 
the creator.  Since transformative use here is intricately linked to the change of 
specific purpose, there is good reason for preferring a provision that deems 
transformativeness. 
The other additional choice is to provide for a presumption of transformative use.  
The presumption option would transfer the burden of proof to the copyright owner to 
convince the court that the UGC in question is not transformative.  This could be 
based on the assertion that the UGC is not creative or original or that the real 
intention of its creator is not consistent with the apparent purpose of its creation.  
However, there may be greater subjectivity in the analysis by the courts and the 
outcome could be more unpredictable.  The safeguard accorded by a presumption, 
                                                                                                                                                 
224 Id. (“[I]n Justice Story’s words, it would merely “supersede the objects” of the original.”) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
225 See GOWERS REVIEW, supra note 218, at 66 (noting that the purpose of the transformative 
works exception is to “enable creators to rework material for a new purpose or with a new 
meaning”). 
226 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–81 (1994). 
227 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 9(2) (Sept. 9, 1886)  
[hereinafter Berne Convention], available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/trtdocs_wo001.html. 
228 See CSM Report, supra note 177, at 8–10 (explaining how each type of purpose adds value 
to th content, thus making it transformative).  The less of a direct substitute that the UGC is for the 
original, the more likely it fits into a categorical exception (especially for option one where other 
forms of usage or purpose can be eligible for its protection). 
229 Id. 
[11:240 2011] The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law 278 
 
especially in relation to option one, is that UGC that is unoriginal or that serves a 
bad faith ulterior motive will not be able to obtain protection on the ostensible basis 
of a genuine change of purpose. 
c. Creator (“Profile”) 
Amateur and non-commercial users have different incentives to create, use, and 
share their works compared to the professional and commercially driven content 
owners.230  These incentives have strong social and cultural impacts.231  The 
restrictive effects of the exclusive right to create derivatives have long been criticized 
by eminent experts in this field as stifling both continued ‘run-on’ creativity and 
digital technology innovations that facilitates it.232 
There are also many legitimate reasons for non-amateurs to create content 
outside of their professional practices and routines.233  One reason is that it provides 
an opportunity for non-amateurs to claim ownership of their work, as opposed to 
work created for an employer, which belongs to the employer.234  This category of 
creators should also be included, qualified by the non-commercial purpose condition 
and on condition that it is not work-related, so that the new work belongs to them 
and not to the employer. 
d. Non-Commerciality (“Purpose”) 
Commerciality is one of the fundamental considerations in the apportionment 
and balance of rights under the U.S. copyright regime.235  For example, in the U.S., 
                                                                                                                                                 
230 See OECD REPORT, supra note 2, at 47.  Other terms referring to UGC that have been used 
interchangeably to describe these types of works include “user created content” or UCC “consumer 
generated media” as well as “amateur digital content.”  These terms reflects more clearly the central 
role of the amateur and non-commercial professional creator in UGC. 
231 Id. 
232 See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE:  THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY 
171–73 (Penguin, 2008) (arguing that Copyright law’s reach has extended too far, covering 
publishers and individuals alike in any form, which stifles creativity); LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 
164, at 254–73 (listing five principle ways in which Copyright law should be reformed in order to 
accommodate the developments of modern technology); Lawrence Lessig, Free(ing) Culture for 
Remix, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 961, 970 (2004) (“A loss of control caused by a shifting technology has led 
policy makers and content owners to scramble to find alternatives for reinforcing control.”). 
233 See, e.g., Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 732 (1989) (holding that a 
work created in the course and scope of employment is property of the employer not the employee).  
234 Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (providing definition for works for hire). 
235 See 4 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 13.05[1][c].  In explaining why commercial use tends to cut 
against a fair use defense, Nimmer point out that: 
even that ‘while commercial motivation and fair use can exist side by side, the 
court may consider whether the alleged infringing use was primarily for public 
benefit or for private commercial gain’ which inclines against fair use in a 
commercial context, but leaves wide latitude for the court to consider all the other 
factors that may outweigh this single fact under appropriate circumstances.  
Labeling a use as ‘commercial,’ in other words, should not end the analysis. 
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commercial use and profit-making are some of the key reasons behind the exclusive 
rights afforded to authors and are important components of fair use analysis.236  It is 
also the reason for the predominantly civil and equitable remedies for infringement 
and the awarding of monetary damages and sanctions.237 
The nature of the use embodies the spirit, if not the form, of fairness.238  
Commercialization of UGC does not necessarily affect the value or profitability of the 
existing work that is used.  There is not necessarily any direct relationship between 
profitability to the copyright owner and the manner of exploitation by others.239  In 
fact, in certain cases, it can even add value to the original work,  by providing added 
exposure.240  Moreover, even if there is some financial detriment to the copyright 
owner, the counter weight of public interest in re-creativity and innovations for social 
benefits may also justify non-commercial usage as a fair compromise between the 
parties.241  From the perspective of the copyright owner, a non-commercial use 
requirement renders the exception or exemption a narrower one, which should be a 
more acceptable position for them. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Id. (citations omitted). 
236 Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Principles Project:  Directions for Reform, 25 BERKLEY 
TECH. L.J. 1175, 1176 (2010). 
[C]opyright law carefully balances the interests of the public in access to 
expressive works and the sound advancement of knowledge and technology, on 
the one hand, with the interests of copyright owners in being compensated for 
uses of their works and deterring infringers from making market-harmful 
appropriations of their works, on the other. 
Id. at 1176. 
237 See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (“The sole interest of the United 
States and the primary objective in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by 
the public from the labors of authors.”); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the 
Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”).  The U.S. does not recognize an 
absolute, natural right in an author to prevent others from accessing, copying and otherwise 
exploiting his or her work. 
238 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., Inc., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (“The 
crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is not whether the sole motive of the use is monetary gain but 
whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the 
customary price.”). 
239 See e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994) (“[W]hen . . . the 
second use is transformative, market substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may not 
be so readily inferred . . . it is more likely that [a parody] will not affect the market for the original 
in a way cognizable under this factor, that is, by acting as a substitute for it.”).  The difference 
between commercial usage (on the part of the user) and profitability (to the copyright owner) can 
complicate things.  The two are not necessarily related.  Just as non-commercial uses can have an 
adverse impact of profitability, commercial uses need not (although it may in most cases) have any 
adverse impact on profitability.  The exposure given to a copyrighted work used in a UGC without 
permission can also outweigh any negative effect on the profitability of that work. 
240 See, e.g., Litman, supra note 176, at 175–76 (proffering the Star Wars and Star Trek 
franchises as examples of how fan-based creative works can enhance the popularity of the original 
works).  Similarly, a songwriter can benefit from increased sale of the original version of the song, 
obtain statutory royalties, reap greater profits from greater exposure such as stronger attendance, 
and profits from concerts and broadcast or licensing interest. 
241 Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts” 
infers that an important consideration in granting copyright protection is the public’s interest in 
creativity). 
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But what is “commercial purpose” and what does the condition entail?  For 
example, there may be some confusion in cases where the user generates content and 
acts as his or her own host.242  Celebrity bloggers have been known to derive indirect 
benefits including those from advertisement revenue merely based on the popularity 
of the website alone.243  In cases where the commercial benefits are incidental, the 
motives of the UGC creator and his or her profile should be irrelevant.  However, 
motive is relevant if profit is generated directly from the UGC (i.e., through the use of 
existing works in product placement or endorsement on a blog) or where UGC and 
the commercial objective of the website is intricately linked (e.g. the original objective 
of the website hosting UGC is to profit from it such as a music or DJ remix sharing 
website).  Motive is relevant. 
It is important to separate indirect benefits, from direct commercial usage and 
only allow protection for those UGC creators who get their benefits, if any, 
incidentally or indirectly.244  This also acknowledges that motivations of derivative 
users generating content are different from original creators.245 
In summary, the test of commercial purpose is an objective-subjective one based 
on the purpose and context of the UGC rather than actual and indirect commercial 
gain.  An objective test is thus formulated from the user’s subjective perspective and 
based on his or her bona fide motives and intentions. 
e. General Observations Regarding the Proposed UGC Limitation 
First, there will be a possible overlap between some existing statutory carve-outs 
with the proposed UGC provision, in particular, the scope of fair use coverage.246  The 
extent of overlap with statutory purpose-based exemptions will depend on the list of 
enumerated purposes to be included into the UGC exemption.  However, overlapping 
defenses are not necessarily objectionable, especially when they make a political or 
policy statement, meet different objectives or cover areas that may not be fully within 
the scope of one or the other.247 
                                                                                                                                                 
242 See e.g., Clay LePard, Top YouTube Earners Share Their Strategy, ABCNEWS.COM (Oct. 18, 
2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/top-youtube-earners-share-
strategies/story?id=11894696#.TwHhRE_t4aQ (discussing how YouTube users have been able to 
create channels, host shows, and generate income from creating YouTube videos).  
243 Id. 
244 In the opinion of this author, this is a fair compromise especially after the subtle shift in the 
judicial opinion after Campbell.  See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 584 (1994) 
(“If, indeed, commerciality carried presumptive force against a finding of fairness, the presumption 
would swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of § 107, including 
news reporting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship, and research, since these activities are 
generally conducted for profit in this country.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
245 Id. 
246 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).  
247 For example, it is not likely that all the recommended purposes will be covered by statutory 
exemptions; and in particular, the extent of overlap will be smaller in other Commonwealth 
countries that have the narrower fair dealing provision under their copyright laws.  The extent of 
overlap will also be smaller if option one is preferred, given its potentially wider scope. 
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Second, the UGC proposal under its different permutations can have different 
effects.  Under both options, it can serve to protect a host of activities as defined by 
their purpose without the need for separate or additional statutory enactment.  The 
incremental rate of extending protections to the existing enumerated list of purposes 
has been slow, especially in countries with only narrow fair dealing protections and 
other closed-list purpose specific exemptions.248  Also, protection for UGC have thus 
far not been statutorily enacted and have rarely been sought in the courts, thereby 
giving rise to a lack of jurisprudence and precedents.  As discussed, Canada has come 
the closest to an enactment of such a limitation, as a clear recognition of the rising 
importance of UGC. 
Third, the specified purposes will have special status in either option, as the 
proposal should be deemed, or at least presumed to be, transformative as to elevate 
the nature of the protection.  The very re-purposing of original works into UGC 
renders such re-use transformative.  Including an enumerated list of purposes is 
another way of recognizing user rights as opposed to user defenses.249  The focus is on 
a very specific type of protection for a specific, albeit large, class of stakeholders and 
in recognition of a new social phenomenon and order.  A statutory enactment 
focusing on specific purposes with definable limits will provide greater order in 
practices and clarity to the scope of protection. 
4. Identification of Types of Commonly Accepted Purposes 
Given the justifications made for an enumerated list of purposes that can be 
recognized as customary derivative uses of existing content for the purpose of 
creating UGC, the next question relates to the identification of the types of purposes 
that are commonly accepted.  It is important that these purposes are accepted both 
socially and culturally, not only in a cyberspace society, but also in the political 
climate of the jurisdiction considering such a provision.  For purposes of this article, 
that jurisdiction is the U.S. 
The purposes are categorized below according to the similarity of their function 
although they may differ in form and effect.  Some of these purposes may also 
overlap as UGC can be created with several purposes in mind, hence they may not be 
mutually exclusive.  The recommended purposes, substantially match the categories 
derived from the CSM Report.250  The six types of uses forming the core purposes are 
selected based on their widespread use and acceptance as UGC. 
                                                                                                                                                 
248 See P.B. HUGENHOLTZ & MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, FAIR USE IN EUROPE:  IN SEARCH OF 
FLEXIBILITIES 4 (Nov. 2011). 
249 See Chik, supra note 101, at 179. 
250 See CSM Report, supra note 177, at 7–15. 
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a.  Commentary 
“Commentary” is a general form of expression that constitutes a series of notes 
or statements in one or more forms of expression.251  The purpose of commentary is to 
provide a perspective that may or may not be meant to elicit debate or discussion.252  
It can address any topic, or it may relate to the ‘borrowed’ content itself, like when it 
serves as a critique of the existing work or works.  Whatever the case, unlike 
personal reportage or diaries, it relates to the work of others.253 
A commentary can take many forms and, and can be direct or indirect, although 
it is more likely to be the former.254  For example, a blog post can directly post 
subjective criticisms on a book or a piece of music.  Additionally, a piece of music can 
be critiqued for being unoriginal by comparisons made using snippets of the song 
with other music.  Similarly, a video commentary can be made through a webcast or 
YouTube video.  A commentary can also be in the form of an art piece or show.255 
A commentary is subjective and can be neutral, positive or negative in nature, 
unlike information and knowledge sharing which requires a level of or at least a 
genuine attempt at objectivity.256  Motive is irrelevant.257  It is not a market 
substitute for the original material utilized and may even bring added attention to 
the existing work.  This attention can be a positive development for the copyright 
owner, as opposed to a negative development market substitution creates.258  When a 
commentary is used to generate discussion or debate, it can be conducted within the 
                                                                                                                                                 
251 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994). 
252 See id. 
253 Id. 
254 See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1992) (concerning the use of a 
copyrighted image for the purpose of social commentary); id. at 303 (explaining that Jeff Koons was 
an artist who was sued for allegedly infringing the copyright of the plaintiff’s commercial 
photographic image that appeared on a postcard); id. at 303–04 (noting that the defendant had built 
a model of the image in the photograph for the purpose of public display in an exhibition entitled the 
“Banality Show,” which commented ironically on the clichés that pervades mass media content); 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580 (illustrating that the direct usage of the underlying work was important 
to the outcome).  These cases show that despite the potential breadth of fair use and the positive 
developments and trend in case law towards users’ re-use in the creation of new works, there are 
still restrictions to the unauthorized use of existing works for more indirect and subtle forms of 
expression. 
255 Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309. 
256 See Martha T. Moore, Study:  Rick Perry Nabs Most News Media Coverage, USA TODAY 
(Oct. 17, 2011), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/onpolitics/post/2011/10/rick-perry-news-
coverage-pew-research-barack-obama-/1 (noting that news commentary in a political context was 
polled in varying amounts of positive, negative, and neutral coverage); CARLA WILLIG, INTRODUCING 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH IN PSYCHOLOGY:  ADVENTURES IN THEORY AND METHOD 6 (Open Univ. 
Press 2001) (stating that objective researchers strive to remain “detached . . . and impartial” when 
conducting research). 
257 Rosemont Enter., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (1966) (noting that 
commercial motive has no bearing on whether a commentary constitutes fair use). 
258 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 (“[T]he only harm to derivatives that need concern us . . . is 
the harm of market substitution.  The fact that a parody may impair the market for derivative uses 
by the very effectiveness of its critical commentary is no more relevant under copyright that the like 
threat to the original market.”). 
[11:240 2011]Paying it Forward:  The Case for a Specific Statutory Limitation on  283 
 Exclusive Rights for User-Generated Content Under Copyright Law 
 
forum, like where the UGC platform provides the discussion threads, or outside of 
the forum.259 
b. Parody and Satire 
Parody is “work in which the style of an author or work is closely imitated for 
comic effect or in ridicule.”260  Alternatively, satire is “work holding up human vices 
and follies to ridicule or scorn.”261  Thus, whereas the former is a specific form of 
criticism relating to the author or work ‘borrowed’, satire on the other hand uses 
existing work to criticize the human nature generally.262  Parodies can either flatter 
or cast a negative light on the existing work whereas satire is generally negative in 
nature.263 
For example, it is common for parodies of music videos to be made and uploaded 
onto YouTube immediately after the release of an official video.264  It may involve 
copying or changing the choreography, melody or lyrics, and also other things like lip-
syncing, over exaggerations, or caricatures.265  Movies and television shows that 
depict the human condition can be spoofed such as in a “mockumentary” which is a 
                                                                                                                                                 
259 See, e.g., Youtube Community Guidelines, YOUTUBE, 
http://www.youtube.com/t/community_guidelines (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) (discussing the 
comment system within the YouTube community). 
260 Parody-Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/parody. 
261 Satire-Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/satire.  See CSM Report, supra note 177, at 7–8.  In discussing the types and 
purposes of UGC, the CSM report explains that: 
In conventional copyright law, parody is among the most common and 
uncontroversial examples of “transformative” fair use.  It also is near the core of 
the fair use doctrine as an enabler of free expression.  When a parodist quotes 
existing text, image, or music to comment upon it, this practice is really nothing 
more than criticism carried on by other means . . . .  Satire (the use of media 
content to poke fun at other objects, such as politicians) is also eligible for fair use 
consideration, although not as readily as parody.  But if the essential hallmark of 
‘transformativeness’ is the repurposing of existing content (thus adding value to 
it), then many satiric uses—such as occur in the online videos researchers found 
here—also should qualify as fair use. 
Id. 
262 See 4 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 13.05[C][1]; see also Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 
F. 3d 1257, 1265  (11th Cir. 2001).  In distinguishing parody from satire, the court stated: 
[p]arody, which is directed toward a particular literary or artistic work, is 
distinguishable from satire, which more broadly addresses the institutions and 
mores of a slice of society.  Thus, parody needs to mimic an original to make its 
point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim’s . . . imagination, 
whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the 
very act of borrowing. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
263 See 4 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 13.05[C][1]. 
264 See, e.g., Jenna Wortha, Banned From YouTube:  Parody Guitar Videos, WIRED (Feb. 8, 
2008), http://www.wired.com/underwire/2008/02/watch-the-parod/ (discussing a user who created 
parody videos on YouTube to which copyright owners claimed infringement). 
265 Id. 
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type of film or television show in which fictitious events are presented in 
documentary format.266 
Parodies and satires are increasingly important components of UGC as 
technology increasingly empowers and encourages the common user to express an 
opinion.267  However, parody and satire in general have increasingly been recognized 
as an important form of free speech and subsumed as a defense into the copyright 
legislation of many countries.  For example, in 2005 the Australian Copyright Act 
incorporated the fair dealing exclusion for the purpose of parody or satire.268  Another 
example is the “parody, pastiche and caricature” provision in France.269  The 
provision states that once a work has been disclosed the author may not prohibit 
parody, pastiche and caricature; provided that even though the works must be 
similar, the public must be able to differentiate between them.270  Thus, there may be 
an overlap in those jurisdictions that already have such an exemption or that have 
an exception that can cover these forms of expression. 
c. Pastiche or Collage 
Pastiche refers to “work that imitates the style of previous work” and also “[a] 
composition made up of selections from different works.”271  Similarly, a collage is “a 
creative work that resembles [a composition made of various materials] in 
incorporating various materials or elements.”272  However, it is also commonly used 
to refer to smaller scale endeavors like individualistic and amateur works such as 
songs incorporating different musical styles and scrap-book making respectively.273 
                                                                                                                                                 
266 See, e.g., Jill Serjeant, Out with Old, in with New in Golden Globe TV Race, REUTERS (Dec. 
15, 2011) (discussing the popularity of the mockumentary “Modern Family”). 
267 Compare Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (using sampling for 
direct parody and determined to constitute fair use despite the commercial aspect of the venture) 
with Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 184–85 (1991) 
(indicating the importance of obtaining permission to use samples from an existing work to a create 
new compositions). 
268 See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 41A (Austl.); see also Maree Sainsbury, Parody, Satire and 
Copyright Infringement:  The Latest Addition to Australian Fair Dealing Law, 12 MEDIA & ARTS 
L.R. 292, 292–319 (2007) (discussing the 2005 amendments in the Australian Copyright Act and the 
impact it has on various fair uses); Damien O’Brien & Brian Fitzgerald, Digital Copyright Law in a 
YouTube World, 9 INTERNET L. BULLETIN 1, 71–74 (2006); O’Brien & Fitzgerald, Mashups, supra 
note 118, at 17–19 (creating an understanding of the impact that the Australian Copyright Act has 
on various forms of online creativity, namely mash-ups and remixes). 
269 Compare Law on the Intellectual Property Code No.92-597, L. 122-5(2) (1992) (Fr.), with 
Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights (1993), art. 24 (Ger.) (“free use” provision allows use of an 
existing work belonging to another to be published and exploited without the consent of the author 
of the work used). 
270 Id. 
271 Pastiche-Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/pastiche. 
272 Collage-Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/collage. 
273 See KEMBREW MCLEOD & RUDOLF KUENZLI, CUTTING ACROSS MEDIA, APPROPRIATION ART, 
INTERVENTIONIST COLLAGE, AND COPYRIGHT LAW 1–2 (Kembrew McLeod & Rudolf Kuenzli, eds., 
2011). 
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A pastiche or collage does not, however, include mere compilation of existing 
works such as a greatest hits album or an anthology.274  Thus, the practice of splicing 
movies in parts on YouTube is still highly unlikely to pass either the fair use test or 
to be protected under this part of the provision.275  Nonetheless, the provision may 
include a video montage or a music megamix.276 
Similar to parody and satire, this category has also been increasingly recognized 
as a valid carve-out from copyright liability.  For example, the 2006 Gowers Review 
that was commissioned by the U.K. government has suggested an amendment of 
applicable European Union (“EU”) copyright law to allow for an exception for 
creative, transformative or derivative work, within the parameters of the Berne 
Convention three-step test, which is discussed later in this paper.277  The Gowers 
Review also endorsed broadening the list of exclusions to include protections for 
works of caricature, parody, and pastiche.278 
d. Personal Reportage or Diaries 
“Personal reportage” or “diaries” refer to the production of news, personal views, 
and other information related to an individual, which in the UGC context is done 
publicly for sharing.279  Blogs are one of the most common manifestation of this 
practice.280  Because blogs have become wide-spread, UGC platforms have made it 
easier for non-technically savvy individuals to join in the movement, through 
websites including Tumblr, a blog hosting platform with customizable templates,281 
Flickr, used to manage and share photos,282 YouTube, a video-sharing platform283, 
Facebook, the preeminent social networking site,284 Twitter, a micro-blogging 
service,285 and MySpace, another social networking website but with a strong focus 
on amateur music.286  These various platforms indicate that the form can vary 
greatly.  This category is the clearest manifestation of the ‘me’ generation with the 
focus on individualism. 
                                                                                                                                                 
274 See 4 NIMMER, supra note 46, § 13.05 (discussing “transformative” requirement). 
275 Id. 
276 Id. 
277 GOWERS REVIEW, supra note 218, at 68.  This recommendation would bring the EU 
copyright regime one step closer to the developments in U.S. jurisprudence that have produced new 
lines of defenses such as the “transformative use” doctrine. 
278 Id. 
279 See CSM Report, supra note 177, at 12. 
280 See OECD REPORT, supra note 2, at 11 (comparing the number of bloggers compared to the 
number of other types of UGC in the U.S. and in Japan). 
281 See About Tumbler, TUMBLR, http://www.tumblr.com/about (last visited Jan. 30, 2012). 
282 See About Flickr, FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com/about/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2012). 
283 See About Youtube, YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/about_youtube (last visited Jan. 
30, 2012). 
284 See About Facebook, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/facebook?sk=info (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2012). 
285 See About Twitter, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/about (last visited Jan. 30, 2012). 
286 See About Us—Myspace.com, MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com/Help/AboutUs?pm_cmp 
=ed_footer (last visited Jan. 30, 2012); see also supra Part IV.C.3.d (discussing amateur works). 
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e. Re-Interpretations 
“Re-interpretation” refers to the re-invention or re-combination of copyrighted 
works to create new meaning or expression through the inclusion of other original 
works.287  “Fan laborers” form the biggest re-users for this category.  While their 
motives vary greatly, their purpose is always for personal self-expression and 
appreciation.288 
There are many examples of re-interpretations.  For music, they can range from 
cover versions of songs to music mash-ups, and remixes.289  For vidding,290 they 
include video mash-ups, fanvids and music video re-enactments, which may include 
actual singing or lip-syncing, original or new choreography and new sets or actual 
background effects.291  For literary works, a common example is fan fiction, which 
incorporates all or part of the characters, story and setting of an existing work or 
works in a re-interpretation that suits the fan’s preference or fantasy.  In the gaming 
community, fan-made machinima, which are films made within video games, are also 
common.292 
Re-interpretation is most common in the music sharing community through the 
sampling of components of a song or parts of choreography.293  This is perhaps 
because of the length of songs and music videos, the availability of digital tools, the 
accessibility of existing works, the relative ease of use and the low labor and cost 
involved in the creation of such UGC.  It is also common for re-interpretations to 
contain original material that can be very inventive and creative in their own 
right.294  This may be achieved, for example, by the inclusion of new music, lyrics, 
subtitles, images, dialog, sound effects, or animation to existing works.295  There are 
many tools and applications available online that facilitates such forms of expression 
even amongst the most amateur of users.296 
                                                                                                                                                 
287 See Tushnet, supra note 96, at 895. 
288 See generally Deborah Tussey, From Fan Sites to Filesharing:  Personal Use in Cyberspace, 
35 GA. L. REV. 1129, 1139, 1151–56 (2001) (discussing various forms of personal “fan” expression). 
289 See Lessig, supra note 232, at 967–68.  Mash-ups are songs made up of the combination of 
two or more different existing sound recordings while remixes are works that re-edit (and sometimes 
also combine) existing songs with added components, often to change the genre of a song (e.g. DJ 
mixes create dance/club versions of original music that can be pop, ballad, adult contemporary, hip-
hop, rhythm and blues or that belongs to any other genre). 
290 See generally Tushnet, supra note 96, at 895–900 (examining the features of vidding and 
traces the proposal by proponents of UGC for an exemption for noncommercial remix video to 
address the in terrorem effect of anti-circumvention law on fair use). 
291 Id. at 895–96. 
292 See Brad King, Machinima: Games Act Like Films, WIRED (July 23, 2002), 
http://www.wired.com/gaming/gamingreviews/news/2002/07/53929. 
293 See Tushnet, supra note 96, at 895–900. 
294 Id. at 895. 
295 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (examining work 
which borrowed lyrics and certain musical composition); King, supra note 292 (utilizing existing art 
resources from video game in creating video compositions). 
296 See, e.g., VIRTUALDJ, http://www.virtualdj.com (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) (sound mixing 
software with free version and robust community discussion). 
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Re-interpretation should be distinguished from mere copying and should not be 
a pretext for abuse or exploitation.  The more significant the changes made, whether 
to the material, context, meaning, or experience, the more transformative it becomes. 
f. Incidental Use 
It may be contradictory to categorize incidental use as a purpose per se as the 
‘use’ in this case can be unintentional or irrelevant to the actual purpose of utilizing 
an existing work.  An example of this is the accidental inclusion of background music 
in a home recording where the focus is on another subject matter.297  Incidental uses 
can also be intentional, such as the use of a work as an example to represent a genre 
or to illustrate a point of view.298  Such uses can, for instance, be education and 
research related.299  It is also common in videos uploaded into video sharing websites 
like YouTube and it can overlap with some of the above categories including personal 
diaries where the focus is on the UGC maker.300 
g. Information and Knowledge Sharing (and Archiving) 
Individual internet users often share information and knowledge through social 
networking platforms and personal blogs.  Online encyclopedias like Wikipedia and 
Citizendium are prominent examples of websites where users gather to share and 
collaborate on materials.301  Group-based aggregation websites also perform a useful 
function and have a clear objective or purpose.302  Dissemination is also an important 
component in this category, but one must be careful not to include archiving per se if 
the UGC merely involves copying, even if it is of materials that are in danger of 
extinction. 
The statutory exceptions or exemptions for research, study and ‘librarying’ 
activities indicate that information and knowledge sharing is already an important 
factor relating to copyrights.303  Similarly, permissible exclusions for private copying 
and ‘librarying’ contribute to the archiving of human knowledge and materials. 
                                                                                                                                                 
297 Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
298 E.g. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605. 612–13 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(holding that, in the context of fair use, the unauthorized reproduction of seven copies of old concert 
posters in a “coffee table book” documenting the thirty-year history and career of the Grateful Dead 
rock band was fair and transformative as the use was for “historical” value and not for “creative 
value”). 
299 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (detailing fair use exceptions which include research and education). 
300 See, e.g., Lenz 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1151–53 (mixing copyrighted music and personal tape of 
family). 
301 CITIZENDIUM, http://en.citizendium.org/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2012); WIKIPEDIA, 
http://www.wikipedia.org/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2012). 
302 Purpose of Wikipedia, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Purpose (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2012). 
303 See 17 U.S.C. §107; see generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
451 (1984) (discussing the practice of “librarying”). 
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5. Conclusion to Discussion on Types of Purposes  
For the U.S., this proposed UGC limitation provision would supplement and 
overlap with the current fair use provision, by adding to the purpose-specific 
exemptions.  Alternately, this would incrementally expand the exemptions from 
infringement and add to the list of purpose-specific exemptions for other countries 
that already have purpose-specific fair dealing provisions, such as Canada.304 
Ineligibility for the UGC statutory limitation does not mean that a UGC creator 
cannot still rely on the general fair use exception as an alternative defense.305  As 
noted in the beginning of this article, there are many forms of UGC as a whole as 
well as other types of uses that may not fit into the scope of the proposed exclusion.  
The fair use exception is wider in scope than the proposed exemption in either of the 
two permutation or options.306  It is possible for some UGC to fall within the scope of 
both types of statutory limitation.  There is an overlap between the two, especially 
given the similarity in some of their considerations.307  However, the UGC provision 
is not a subset of the fair use exception nor is it merely a “perfect substitute” for fair 
use. 
In summation, option one has a general exception not tied to any type of use, 
which will be similar to the fair use exception and with a non-exhaustive list of 
purposes constituting, or presumed as, transformative uses.  Option two, on the other 
hand, the more limited option, is to make the exemption purpose specific according to 
an exhaustive list of purposes that can also be deemed or presumed transformative in 
effect.  Option two would be more likely to comply with the Berne Convention three-
step test, which is discussed in the following section. 
D. Overcoming the Berne Three-Step Test 
The copyright legislation in many countries contains limitations in the form of 
statutory exemptions for specific activities and purposes including personal use, 
teaching, research, comment, criticism, quotation, news reporting, and librarying.308  
                                                                                                                                                 
304 See, e.g., Canada Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, s. 29 (providing exceptions for fair 
dealing related to research, private study, criticism, review, and news reporting among others). 
305 See, e.g., CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 339, paras. 
53–60 (Can.) (discussing application of a more general approach to fair use in light of statutory 
limitations). 
306 See id. (demonstrating uses that fall short of the legal definition of UGC and hence its 
defense (e.g. acts done for commercial gain), can still seek the protection of the fair use exception). 
307 Rush, supra note 181, at 671 (“When Bill C-32 uses the word “use” in the context of a new 
user-generated content right, the indication demonstrates further rapprochement to the notion of 
fair use as a practical alternative to implied license even if the right/exception is not expressly 
tempered by ‘fairness.’”). 
308 The type and extent of limitations vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  See e.g., Council 
Directive 2001/29/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, art. 5 (providing a list of purpose-specific exemptions 
that were suitable to the legal traditions and the socio-cultural environment of the EU member 
states, which required the member states to adhere to the three-step test); The list of optional 
defenses is conditional to implementation in the individual members states and include the use of 
copyrighted works for private use, education purposes, quotations and parody.  Id. at art. 5(5). 
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In recent years, it has become more common to make exemptions to protect the 
internet infrastructure and other innovative forms of technology.309  These 
exemptions include user caching, temporarily reproducing materials made in the 
course of communication, and back-up copying of computer programs.310 
The question naturally arises as to whether the inclusion of such a statutory 
limitation by the U.S. or any other jurisdiction constitutes a violation of its 
international obligations under the trade and copyright conventions to which it is a 
signatory.  Such conventions include the WTO and the Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual property Rights (“TRIPS”),311 the Berne Convention,312 the World 
Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty (“WIPO Copyright Treaty),313 
and the World Intellectual Property Organization Performance and Phonograms 
Treaty Act (“WIPO Performance and Phonograms Treaty”).314  This is because there 
is a restriction to the creation of such limitations to copyright protection in the form 
of a “three-step test” under the above-mentioned international legal instruments that 
relate to the copyright regime. 
The three-step test was constructed to assess and limit the validity of limitations 
made to the exclusive rights of copyright owners.315  Under the test, exceptions to the 
rights of copyright owners are restricted to certain special cases that do not conflict 
with a normal exploitation of the work or unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the copyright holder.316  In other words, it acts as a filter to determine the 
compatibility of statutory limitations contained in national copyright laws.  Any 
proposal to amend or add exceptions in the relevant copyright legislation of member 
states must be consistent with this test.317 
                                                                                                                                                 
309 See, e.g., Law on Copyright and Neighbouring Rights (1994), art. 23–35 (Pol.) (detailing 
copyright exceptions in Poland, for example an exception exists for dissemination of television 
broadcasts by a group cable network) available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=3500 (English translation provided by WIPO) (last 
visited Jan. 30, 2012). 
310 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a–d) (2006). 
311 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—
Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, [hereinafter TRIPS], available at 
http://www.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-TRIPS.pdf. 
312 Berne Convention, supra note 227, at art. 9(2). 
313 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 
(1997) [hereinafter WIPO Copyright Treaty], available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wct/index.html. 
314 World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 
1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997) [hereinafter WIPO Phonograms Treaty], available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/trtdocs_wo034.html. 
315 See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law?  The WTO Panel 
Decision and the “Thee-Step Test” for Copyright Exceptions 1–9 (Columbia Law Sch. Center for Law 
and Econ. Working Paper No. 181 2001), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=253867 (analyzing recent applications of the three-step 
test). 
316 Id. at 3; see MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP TEST 
283–93 (Kluwer Law Int’l, 2004); Daniel J. Gervais, Towards A New Core International Copyright 
Norm:  The Reverse Three-Step Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 15–17 (2005). 
317 Berne Convention, supra note 227, at art. 9(2) (“It shall be a matter for legislation in the 
countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided 
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The three-step test is contained in article 13 of the TRIPS Agreement.318  That 
provision is based on provisions contained in earlier copyright related treaties, 
namely, article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, article 10 of the WIPO Copyright 
Treaty, and article 16 of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty.319  
Because its earliest appearance was in the Berne Convention, it is often referred to 
as the “Berne three-step test.”320 
Although there are various applications of this test, that divergence should not 
be an impediment to the enactment of a UGC limitation for several reasons, both 
practical and academic.321  Specific statutory exemptions are less likely to be 
contentious in the first place.322  Thus, many purpose-specific exemptions such as for 
parody and satire as well as personal use activities have passed the three-step test.323  
In particular, an exhaustive list of exemptions, such as that proposed in option two, 
should likewise be acceptable.  In fact, limitations in the form of enumerated 
exemptions enjoy widespread acceptance.  International instruments themselves 
even contain some such provisions.324 
On the other hand, option one is likely to be more controversial as it functions in 
a more flexible and amorphous manner that is closer to the fair use model.  As a 
result, option one may give rise to opposition based on the three-step test.  However, 
even though the U.S. has been subject to criticism for the open-ended nature of its 
fair use provision, which has a much wider scope than the option one proposal,325 it 
has successfully retained the provision for decades and its courts have applied it 
extensively.326  In fact, the U.S. government has even successfully exported this 
concept abroad to other countries including to Israel and Singapore.327  Many of its 
proponents have also made compelling and cogent arguments in defense of its scope 
                                                                                                                                                 
that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author”) (emphasis added). 
318 TRIPS, supra note 311, at art. 13; See Ginsburg, supra note 315, at 1. 
319 Ginsburg, supra note 315, at 1. 
320 See Gervais, supra note 316, at 28. 
321 See P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Martin R.F. Senftleben, Fair Use in Europe. In Search of 
Flexibilities, INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATION LAW (Nov. 2011) (indicating that national approaches to 
the determination of limitations vary). 
322 See 17 U.S.C § 110(5) (2006) (providing limitations on exclusive rights as exemption on 
certain performances and displays); see DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:  DRAFTING 
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 237–48 (Sweet & Maxwell, 3d ed., 2008); Gervais, supra note 316, at 14–15. 
323 William Patry, Fair Use, the Three-Step Test, and the Counter-Reformation, THE PATRY 
COPYRIGHT BLOG (Apr. 2, 2008, 2:44 PM), http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2008/04/fair-use-three-
step-test-and-european.html. 
324 See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 227, at art. 10, 10bis (providing an exemption for 
quotation, educational use, and attribution and for further possible free uses mainly for reportage). 
325 See Ruth Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
75, 113–16 (2000); Ginsburg, supra note 315, at 6–7. 
326 See, e.g., Jay Dratler Jr., Distilling the Witches’ Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 43 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 233, 234–36 (1988) (discussing the concept of “fair abridgement” that subsequently 
evolved into fair use); Gyles v. Wilcox, (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 490 (discussing the concept of “fair 
use” long before it became codified under section 107). 
327 See e.g. Richard J. Peltz, Global Warming Trend?  The Creeping Indulgence of Fair Use in 
International Copyright Law, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 267, 285 (2009) (“U.S.-style fair use has 
plainly gained ground in at least one jurisdiction:  Israel, where the Knesset in 2007 enacted a 
copyright law with a statutory fair use doctrine, effective May 2008.”). 
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and usefulness,328 particularly in the context of the digital age where what may be 
considered “normal exploitation” may evolve or expand due to rapid technological 
progress, user behavior and preferences geared favorably towards UGC with its 
social utility and benefits.329 
Moreover, in the history of the WTO, there have neither been formal challenges 
brought against the fair use provision in any international dispute resolution forum 
nor many disputes over the three-step test.330  Thus, in all likelihood, such a wider 
provision should also survive the possible threat of any complaint based on the test.  
However, the development of these additional exemptions in an international fora 
like the WTO and WIPO will certainly help to ensure that it passes the test and the 
endorsement by such organizations and the incorporation into the relevant 
international copyright treaties and conventions will avoid disputes on this basis. 
E. Incidental Effects on UGC Technological Services and Platforms 
UGC technological services and platforms have an integral role in providing the 
forum, the technical know-how and the tools for the creation and dissemination of 
UGC.  Many of the most successful UGC platforms have pioneered new forms of 
social behavior of a traditionally physical form of activity with a primary focus on the 
amateur or non-professional user.331  This includes wikis, social networking and 
video-sharing websites like Wikipedia, Facebook and YouTube respectively.332  This 
excludes internet intermediaries that do not primarily deal with UGC content or 
have the creation of such content as its objective,333 which may only incidentally 
                                                                                                                                                 
328 See SENFTLEBEN, supra note 316, at 113; Gerald Dworkin, Copyright, the Public Interest, 
and Freedom of Speech:  A UK Copyright Lawyer’s Perspective, in COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH:  
COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSES 153, 161–62 (Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen 
eds., 2005). 
329 Jo Oliver, Copyright in the WTO:  The Panel Decision on the Three-Step Test, 25 COLUM. J.L. 
& ARTS 119, 158 (2002).  A more flexible and holistic “dynamic view” is preferred over a strict “fixed 
view”.  Id. at 159.  See also, Annette Kur, Of Oceans, Islands, and Inland Water—How Much Room 
for Exceptions and Limitations Under the Three-Step Test?, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 287, 328 
(2009) (explaining the preferences for a more flexible interpretation of the test). 
330 Dworkin, supra note 329, at 162–63; See Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) 
Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/1234da.pdf. (indicating that there are not many actual 
international disputes that required an interpretation of the test in relation to certain statutory 
exemptions). 
331 See Antony Bruno, YouTube:  Growth in User-Generated Content is Outpacing Official 
Videos, BILLBOARD (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry/digital-and-
mobile/youtube-growth-in-user-generated-content-1005135032.story. 
332 Id. 
333 E.g. file storage or hosting service providers/applications/websites like Megaupload, 
Mediafire and Rapidshare (whether or not requiring registration, security and technological 
safeguards allowing for only individual use for storage and transfer of data), which some considers a 
subset of file sharing technologies.  So far, the courts have denied DMCA safe harbors for file-
sharing sites.  See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Lime Grp. LLC, 784 F. Supp. 2d 389, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (finding that a random sample of 1800 files available through LimeWire, ninety-three percent 
were protected or likely to be protected by copyrights, thus not authorized for free distribution); 
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involve and peripherally include UGC.334  Another distinguishing feature is the peer-
to-public objective of UGC as opposed to the peer-to-peer nature of these other 
intermediaries.335 
Copyright actions have mainly been brought against video-sharing websites with 
minimal success thus far.336  For example, YouTube has won copyright disputes 
brought against it based on the safe harbor provisions in the case of Viacom Int’l Inc. 
v. YouTube Inc.,337 and earlier in Io Group Inc. v. Veoh Networks Inc.338 These 
disputes, however, have yet to reach the apex of the U.S. legal system or obtained the 
endorsement of the U.S. Supreme Court.339 
Thus, adopting either of the proposed UGC statutory limitation will accord the 
UGC intermediary “double protection.” First, the DMCA safe harbor provisions 
constitute an overarching protection for such intermediaries by allowing them to 
perform their functions with the minimal level of obstruction and a reasonable 
amount of responsibility.340  Hence, they are required to respond to notices, but not 
screen or police content.341   In other words, only specific and not general knowledge 
is required and they are not to directly profit from unlawful activities.  Second, the 
specific activities that fall under the proposed limitation will also offer an additional 
layer of protection from an indirect infringement action against them for lack of the 
requisite primary infringement upon which the action could be based.  
An important benefit of a clear UGC limitation is that it will at the very least 
remove the legal uncertainty of creating as well as hosting the elucidated categories 
of purposes and also provide more clarity in determining other UGC content, as is the 
case Option one.  This should remove the incentive for UGC intermediaries to err on 
the side of caution and to preemptively block or subsequently remove content that 
can and should be allowed.  This was indeed what happened in Lenz and in many 
                                                                                                                                                 
Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 2:06-cv-05578, 2009 BL 287268, at *39 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 
2009)(finding that defendants are not entitled to statutory safe harbor under the DMCA) . 
334 Whereas UGC platforms are mainly geared towards enabling user rights in original and 
follow-on creations for various purposes including social networking and citizen journalism, P2P 
services provides a service on a digital online network that is designed primarily to enable file 
transfer and sharing that generally consists of acts amounting to copyright infringement.  Compare 
Arista, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 412, 431; Columbia Pictures, 2009 BL 287268, at *3–7 (involving peer-to 
peer file sharing networks that did not fall within scope of the DMCA), with Viacom Int’l Inc. v. 
YouTube, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 2d 514, 526–27 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (finding that the defendants fall within 
the scope of the DMCA). 
335 See Robert Colvile, Boldly Go Where No One Has Gone Before. Imagine Harry Potter in a 
Clinch with James Bond:  Welcome to the World of Fan Fiction, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Jan. 27, 
2007, at 21. 
336 See Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 526–27. 
337 Id. at 514 (finding for YouTube and granting its motion for summary judgment to dismiss 
Viacom’s litigation). 
338 Io Grp. Inc. v. Veoh Networks, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (N.D. Cal. 2008)  (holding that 
YouTube was protected from liability under the DMCA section 512(c) “online storage” safe harbor 
for third party material uploaded onto its website by users). 
339 See Jane C. Ginsburg, User-Generated Content Sites and Section 512 of the US Copyright 
Act, in COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT AND THE INTERNET 183–98 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2010). 
340 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1)(b) (2006) (defining an online service provider as “a provider of online 
services or network access, or the operator of facilities therefor.”).  This can be interpreted 
expansively to encompass services hosting or distributing third-party content.  
341 Io Grp, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1137; Viacom, 718 F. Supp. 2d 527. 
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other unreported cases or incidents and it was also the reason for those UGC 
intermediaries involved in the negotiation and endorsement of the UGC Principles to 
agree to the terms that, as have been noted, is arguably more biased towards the 
copyright owner.342  This should also have the effect of providing guidance for 
copyright owners in policing and honestly reporting infringing cases as well as for 
UGC creators to walk the line.  Finally, it should also contribute to the reduction of 
litigation relating to UGC.343 
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper highlights the significant impact that IT developments and the 
internet, particularly the rise of UGC on the WWW, have on the reality of modern 
life.  A fair and just balance has to be achieved between both the relevant 
stakeholders and their interests under the copyright regime within the changing 
social context.  The rights and interests of users and consumers as follow-on creators 
and other innovators should be recognized in the new digital environment with the 
technical tools available to them.  The importance of protecting and nurturing the 
development of information and communications technology that facilitates and 
fosters user empowerment should also be recognized so that the social utility of these 
functions are preserved, and unnecessary costly disputes can be avoided. 
A jurisprudential assessment of the objectives and principles upon which 
copyright regime is founded strongly suggests that a statutory UGC limitation, 
whether in the form of a more generalized exception or a purpose-specific exemption, 
is important to achieve this goal.  This can be done through a minor revamping of the 
copyright legislation.  Clarity in the law is an important driving force towards 
progress in the area of UGC.  A universal solution will also help to achieve 
harmonization of the copyright regime and the treatment of UGC in the global arena. 
The law reform proposals and recommendations based on the profile, type and 
nature of UGC to be protected indicate that the protections extend largely to UGC on 
platforms including:  social networking websites (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, MySpace);344 
content-sharing websites mainly meant for individual expression or as re-creative 
space (e.g. YouTube, MySpace, FanFiction);345 user-based collaborative websites; (e.g. 
Wikipedia, Citizendium)346 and citizen journalism portals.347 
                                                                                                                                                 
342 See supra Part II. 
343 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent:  A Theoretical and Empirical 
Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 269–70 (positing that as outcomes become more uncertain parties are 
more willing to litigate).   
344 See supra Part IV.C.4 and accompanying text (facilitating purposes such as commentary, 
parody and satire, collage and pastiche, among others). 
345 Id. (supporting purposes like incidental uses and re-interpretations).  Where it involves use 
of owned material, it can be viewed as an extension of personal use/rights (provided the sharing is 
limited).  Id.  There is competition but also inter-connectivity or cross-carriage of content between 
these websites and services (e.g. Facebook allows video sharing from YouTube and other sites). 
346 Id. (mainly for the purposes of generating information and knowledge sharing among user-
contributors). 
347 Id.  This category of websites and services has other content-related issues beyond IP law 
and they are regulated, and the intermediaries often protected, by a different set of laws. 
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The definition of UGC for the purpose of the proposed statutory protection does 
not encompass all forms of UGC as generally understood by the layman.  Instead, it 
should be defined by a set of conditions and identified purposes.  The proposed legally 
permitted UGC involves the original creation and the re-creation of existing works by 
non-commercially driven users (as opposed to commercial copyright owners), whether 
copyrighted or otherwise, in any combination thereof, which is meant for public 
sharing.  This narrower legal definition of UGC for the purpose of protection from 
copyright infringement is a fair compromise for all the stakeholders concerned.  It is 
hoped that the impetus towards law reform will lead to the reality of its prescription 
and enactment. 
